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Criminal law, by design, assigns culpability for intentional, volitional 
action. Criminal law theory and criminal law doctrine thus both place an 
important emphasis on an individual’s ability to control his or her behavior. 
Mostly, the law presumes that individuals can exercise self-control; in special 
cases, culpability and punishment are lessened because of impaired self-
control. Yet despite this central role for self-control, previous scholarship has 
not examined the implications for criminal law of decades of research in social 
psychology. This Article presents and explores the implications of the most 
important findings of recent social psychology research on self-control: first, 
that individuals think about their actions differently depending on the temporal 
frame of the potential behavior in ways that often impede self-control efforts, 
and second, that self-control is a finite resource that can be depleted by other 
actions and events. The robust findings about when and how individuals are 
able to exercise control over their behavior help to make sense of criminal law 
doctrine’s refusal to consider abstract questions of free will in favor of a focus 
on whether individuals’ actions were under their control on a particular 
occasion. Additionally, the differences in how psychology and law 
conceptualize self-control failure, with psychology offering a far broader 
definition of these instances, demonstrate just how much the law’s theoretical 
conceptions of self-control failure are normative and socially constructed, 
rather than positive and observational. The psychology of self-control has 
important implications for our understanding of the behavior that leads to 
particular criminal conduct and our conceptions of appropriate punishment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Criminal law rests on the assumption that individuals—most of the time—
have free will.1 They act in ways that they choose to act, exercising control 
 
 1 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (noting the “universal and 
persistent . . . belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to 
choose between good and evil”); Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502, 1506 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“The 
whole presupposition of the criminal law is that most people, most of the time, have free will within broad 
limits. They are capable of conforming their actions to the requirements of the law, and of appreciating the 
consequences of failing to do so.”); Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Jr., Genetics, Neuroscience, and 
Criminal Responsibility, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 183, 207–08 (Nita A. 
Farahany ed., 2009) (explaining that there is a fundamental difference between theoretical free will and 
criminal law free will: “the criminal law presumes that individuals actively and consciously choose to engage 
in criminal conduct”). Indeed, modern philosophers and social scientists have suggested that an assumption of 
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over their own behavior. Criminal law is not generally a system of strict 
liability: it largely assigns culpability and punishment to actors who have 
chosen to engage in criminal acts, rather than to actors who have accidentally 
or involuntarily caused harm.2 Despite this central role of free will and self-
control in the conceptualization of criminal responsibility, criminal law 
scholars have not, to date, considered the implications of decades of research 
in social psychology on the mechanisms of self-control.3 This Article suggests 
that examining current social psychology research on self-control offers a 
novel way to amplify our thinking about crime and punishment,4 helping to 
make sense of the way that the law has developed, casting doubt on the 
descriptive validity of legal perspectives on self-control and crime, and 
offering potential guidance as we think about appropriate levels of culpability 
and punishment. 
Criminal law scholars conceptualize self-control and its role in the law in a 
variety of ways, depending on their disciplinary focus. Advances in 
neuroscience, for example, have reinvigorated the debate about the possibility 
of identifying the workings of a “criminal brain” through its unique 
neurological processes, and about whether free will and self-control are 
impossible (or, at the least, implausible) in the face of such (potential) 
biological determinism.5 Others have joined in a more philosophical age-old 
debate between free will and determinism, exploring the degree to which—if at 
all—individuals have free will and can exert it in various circumstances.6 In 
 
free will is critical to the successful functioning of society, regardless of whether or not it is true. See, e.g., 
John Tierney, Do You Have Free Will? Yes, It’s the Only Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at D1. 
 2 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1, at 253 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that crime typically 
requires an act or omission as well as requisite state of mind). But see id. § 5.5, at 288–89 (detailing several 
types of strict liability criminal statutes). 
 3 Only one article has begun to consider the social psychological research on self-control, in the narrow 
context of the provocation defense in British law. See Richard Holton & Stephen Shute, Self-Control in the 
Modern Provocation Defence, 27 O.J.L.S. 49 (2007). 
 4 In a project similar in type but different in focus, Steven Sherman and Joseph Hoffman offered a 
careful exploration of the implications of psychological research on anger for voluntary manslaughter and the 
“heat of passion” defense. Steven J. Sherman & Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Psychology and Law of Voluntary 
Manslaughter: What Can Psychology Research Teach Us About the “Heat of Passion” Defense?, 20 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 499 (2007). 
 5 For discussion of this debate, see Farahany & Coleman, supra note 1, at 206–07; and Owen D. Jones, 
Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW, 
supra note 1, at 125, 138. 
 6 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1587–88 (1994). In 
addition, sociological theories largely take a more deterministic approach, suggesting that “delinquency is an 
adaptation to conditions and social influences in lower-class environments.” Deborah W. Denno, Sociological 
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contrast to both of these approaches, still others use economic principles to 
characterize criminal behavior as the product of a utility calculation in which a 
potential criminal actor weighs the costs and benefits of his actions in deciding 
whether to proceed.7 Such a characterization only makes explanatory sense if a 
prospective criminal actor can bring his actions into line with the dictates of 
the equation—that is, he has free will and can exercise self-control. These 
approaches to criminal law—neurological, philosophical, and economic—
differ in their visions of human behavior and their implications for self-
determinism.8 But all three approaches rest on a shared belief that whether or 
not individuals have control over their own actions when they engage in 
criminal acts matters. 
Yet even as criminal law and criminal law theorists rely profoundly on the 
concepts of free will and self-control, there is rigorous debate over what these 
terms really mean—and what they really mean for criminal law. Modern social 
psychology research on self-control has developed a working model of how an 
individual controls her behavior and has offered several intriguing findings. 
First, one of the most recent theories of self-regulation suggests that systematic 
differences in the way individuals think about near-term and long-term events 
and actions may help to explain self-control failures and successes. People tend 
to construe near-future and distant-future events differently, and this has a 
direct effect on their efforts to bring their behavior into line with their rational 
choices. Second, research has supported the proposition that an individual’s 
self-control is a finite resource that can be used up by other cognitive demands 
and, furthermore, that an individual can get better at self-control over time. 
This work has compared the seeming paradox of self-control to a muscle—that 
is, self-control grows weaker with use in the short term but stronger with use in 
the long term. What this means for the individual is that, when she has used her 
self-control in one setting, she will find it harder to exert self-control in a 
situation that immediately follows. But when she practices controlling her 
 
and Human Developmental Explanations of Crime: Conflict or Consensus?, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 711, 712 
(1985). 
 7 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2, at 242 (5th ed. 1998); STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 552–56 (2004); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 8 These are not the only lenses through which scholars have analyzed criminal law, and I do not mean to 
suggest either (1) that they represent an exhaustive list of perspectives on criminal law or (2) that all criminal 
law scholars writing from the standpoint of neuroscience, philosophy, or economics share a common outlook. I 
mean only to indicate that several prominent trends in criminal law scholarship share a set of assumptions 
about the centrality (if not the meaning) of self-control. 
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012  7:48 AM 
2012] CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-CONTROL 505 
behavior over time, her self-control will eventually grow stronger and will be 
less subject to quick depletion. 
Two important broad insights come from examining this psychological 
research. First, by considering self-control failure at the micro level—in a 
particular moment of action or inaction—psychological research on self-
control helps uncouple self-control questions from broader questions about the 
existence of free will. Psychological research supports the idea that individuals 
differ in the degree to which they can control their own actions. However, 
psychology does not take a clear position on the roots of self-control failure, 
leaving open the question of whether societal factors or some innate biological 
or other characteristics are most influential in dictating the constraints on an 
individual’s ability to control herself. Whether or not free will “truly” exists is 
irrelevant, psychological research suggests, to the question of whether or not 
an individual is able to control his or her behavior in a particular moment. A 
person either controls herself by acting in a way that is consistent with a 
particular set of norms9 or does not control herself by acting in opposition to it. 
The roots of failure to control one’s behavior, important though they may be, 
are separate from the question of an individual’s ability to do so at a specific 
time and place. Psychology’s robust findings on the fine-grained aspects of 
self-control suggest that self-control is a concept with meaning and usefulness 
for the law, regardless of one’s viewpoint about the existence of free will. 
Second, taking psychological research on self-control seriously indicates 
that criminal law may vastly underdescribe the scope of situations in which an 
individual lacks the ability to control her actions. That is, acts that the law calls 
“uncontrolled” are a mere subset of the behavior that psychology would call 
“uncontrolled.” Looking carefully at the psychology research, however, I 
suggest that psychologists may sometimes be overbroad in their definition of 
self-control failure: in particular, psychologists often assume a set of shared 
norms that may not exist. The mismatch between the scope of self-control as 
described by psychology and criminal law helps to highlight that notions of 
self-control in the law are inherently constructed by the law itself, rather than 
reflecting some empirical reality, and that any efforts to define and understand 
the concept and role of self-control in law as purely positive, rather than 
normative, are misguided. 
 
 9 For further discussion of what psychologists mean by acting in a controlled or uncontrolled manner, 
see infra Part II. 
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In Part I, I briefly demonstrate the ways in which the concept of self-
control permeates criminal law, beginning with criminal law theory and then 
considering criminal law doctrine. Part II provides a concise overview of 
psychological research on self-control. Part III examines in greater depth 
psychological research on how information processing about events that occur 
at different times may intersect with self-control and considers the implications 
of this research on criminal law. Part IV describes the research on self-control 
as a finite resource and explores the implications of this “strength” model on 
criminal law. Part V offers some preliminary thoughts about potential 
implications in particular areas of criminal law doctrine and in criminal law 
theory. 
I. SELF-CONTROL AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Efforts to neatly classify and bring order to criminal law theory and 
doctrine are stymied by the scope and complexity of the field. Criminal law 
scholars consider crime from diverse angles, including moral, theoretical, 
philosophical, economic, sociological, neurological, and biological 
perspectives. They consider not only the scope of what ought to constitute 
criminal behavior but also what causes criminal behavior and what appropriate 
punishment ought to be. And criminal law doctrine encompasses crimes as 
diverse as assault and embezzlement, homicide and tax fraud. Yet in a field as 
frustratingly diverse as criminal law, one constant theme is the critical role of 
human self-control. In the following sections, I show how self-control cuts 
across diverse theoretical and doctrinal perspectives, forming an insistent motif 
at the core of criminal law. 
I analyze self-control first in the context of criminal law theory and then in 
criminal law doctrine, and in each setting I further subdivide my analysis into 
broad conceptual groupings. For criminal law theory, I consider three popular 
areas of scholarly focus: neuroscience, retributivism/moral theory, and 
utilitarianism/law and economics. For criminal law doctrine, I consider 
involuntary acts, duress, and mens rea; insanity; justification and excuse; and 
mitigation of punishment. However, there may be significant overlap among 
these categories, and some scholarly perspectives cut across, unite, or simply 
defy them. 
Although these divisions are somewhat blunt, my point here is not to 
articulate a clear and comprehensive topography of criminal law scholarship 
but rather to demonstrate the cross-cutting nature of the concept of self-control 
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across the field as a whole. My brief examination of these areas leaves many 
nuanced issues, debated by those who write in these domains, to the side—not 
because they are unimportant but rather because they are beyond the scope of 
this project. My purpose here, again, is simple: to demonstrate the cross-
cutting and central nature in criminal law of the very concept of an individual’s 
ability to control her behavior. 
A. Criminal Law Theory 
In this section, I explore three prominent strands of thought in current 
criminal law theory scholarship: the neuroscience perspective, the 
retributive/moral theory perspective, and the utilitarian/law and economics 
perspective.10 In each of these, scholars grapple with the question of when and 
how individuals control their behavior and what such control, or lack thereof, 
means for criminal law. I explain the central role that notions of self-control 
play in each perspective in turn below. 
1. Neuroscience Perspective 
Self-control is perhaps the most acute topic of debate in criminal law and 
neuroscience scholarship, a field that encompasses brain science, brain 
imaging, and genetics. Growing developments in neuroscience have prompted 
challenges to classic notions of responsibility. Neurology suggests both a 
certain level of determinism, because it links biological and chemical reactions 
in the brain to manifested behavior, and optimism about potential control by 
the self and/or society, perhaps through chemical or biological intervention. 
For example, brain imaging has helped to reduce criminal punishment in 
certain cases by demonstrating that an individual’s brain tumor or other 
deformity or injury was one of the causes of criminal behavior. When 
neuroscience can show that an individual did not make a “free choice” to act in 
certain way, but instead acted that way because of a biological and identifiable 
abnormality, juries and courts have sometimes been willing to assign lesser 
responsibility and punishment.11 So, too, scholars have suggested that potential 
 
 10 Again, although the divisions I have drawn are somewhat rough, and criminal scholars’ work may 
often overlap or even defy these categories, the distinctions are nonetheless useful as a basic framework for 
discussion. 
 11 See, e.g., Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (“[T]he existence of brain damage 
is a significant mitigating factor that trial courts should consider in deciding whether a death sentence is 
appropriate in a particular case.”); Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting the trial court’s 
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solutions to the problem of criminal behavior may be pharmacologically or 
surgically possible in some of these cases.12 
Others seek to use neuroscience less at the abnormal margins and more in 
the mainstream of criminal activity, suggesting that when we understand the 
process by which individuals make decisions about criminal conduct, we might 
better understand and prevent it.13 Some scholars also argue that new 
technology’s ability to map brain changes and processes provides a foothold 
for arguments that criminal behavior is not really the responsibility of the actor 
but is biologically determined.14 In particular, some practitioners have made 
the argument that research on genetic predispositions to criminal behavior, and 
on the heritability of criminal propensity, demonstrates that certain individuals’ 
actions are not truly voluntary.15 Efforts to convince courts to adopt this 
perspective have been almost completely unsuccessful.16 Nonetheless, these 
challenges based on brain imaging and genetics have generated a robust 
response from criminal law scholars, even those who are enthusiastic about the 
possible implications of neuroscience on law. Nita Farahany and James 
Coleman, for example, forcefully argue that “as a matter of criminal law 
theory, [behavioral genetics and neuroscience] evidence should not inform the 
assessment of criminal responsibility in . . . any meaningful way.”17 The 
intersection of neuroscience and criminal law is, indeed, a textbook example of 
 
imposition of an enhanced sentence in light of the presence of mitigating factors, including “a brain 
tumor . . . that affected [the defendant’s] ability to control his behavior”). 
 12 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2008) (“[N]euroscience is likely to produce a number of different types of 
interventions—surgical, pharmacological, and other—that will be said to prevent, or to lessen the risk of, 
continuing criminal conduct.”). But see John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical 
Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 568 (2006) 
(arguing against pharmacological punishment for sex offenders). 
 13 Jones, supra note 5, at 142. 
 14 See, e.g., Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal Law, 15 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 44 (2005); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and 
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 118 (2006); Christopher Slobogin, The 
Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 165 (2005). 
 15 Deborah Denno notes that, although “[b]ehavioral genetics evidence has not gained widespread 
acceptance in current case law,” “[a]t least 48 criminal cases have referred to behavioral genetics evidence” in 
a thirteen-year period between 1994 and 2007. Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal 
Cases: 1997–2007, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 317, 330–
31. 
 16 See Farahany & Coleman, supra note 1, at 187–205; see also Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65–66 
(Ga. 1995) (rejecting consideration of the defendant’s genetic propensity for criminal behavior). 
 17 Farahany & Coleman, supra note 1, at 185. 
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the tensions at issue in defining the scope of free will, self-control, and 
voluntariness. 
2. Retributive/Moral Theory Perspective 
Moral theorists suggest that the law punishes a set of behaviors that can be 
categorized as morally wrong; when people choose to engage in morally wrong 
acts, they ought to be punished. The retributive justification for criminal law is 
simple: wrongdoers deserve punishment commensurate with the wrong they 
intend.18 As John Rawls explains, “It is morally fitting that a person who does 
wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing.”19 A core belief of a 
retributivist is that an offender ought to be punished “in proportion to her 
desert or culpable wrongdoing.”20 Linking the degree of punishment directly to 
the gravity of the wrong helps to highlight moral theorists’ suggestion that 
punishment is a restoration of a “moral order” that has been violated.21 To 
preserve such moral order, Kant insists that society has a duty to punish those 
who have done wrong.22 
The retributive model “requires some notion of free will that attributes to 
humans responsibility for doing wrong in a way that is not attributed to other 
animals.”23 Notably, Hegel suggests that punishment for criminal acts honors 
the criminal as a rational being.24 Retributive justice is premised on the idea 
that someone ought to be punished for his wrongful act when that person knew 
that what he was doing was wrong and did it anyway. A moral punishment for 
wrongdoing makes no sense when the actor did not understand that the act was 
wrongful or did not mean to engage in a wrongful act. 
 
 18 Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1338 (1983). Recent 
research has added social science data into the discussion of how we determine commensurate punishment—
that is, how we understand desert. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: 
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing and analyzing 
research relating to desert). 
 19 John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955). 
 20 Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 843, 860 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 21 See Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 1338. 
 22 Kant famously claimed that a society about to disband should still execute its murderers on principle. 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 198 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1887). 
 23 See Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 1339. 
 24 David E. Cooper, Hegel’s Theory of Punishment, in HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 151, 153 (Z.A. 
Pelczynski 1971). 
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012  7:48 AM 
510 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:501 
The law’s vision of moral responsibility “generally requires a 
demonstration that the actor made a knowing, rational, and voluntary choice to 
act in a manner that breached community norms.”25 As Stephen Morse 
explains in an article on criminal law culpability and control, “If it is true that 
an agent really could not help or control herself and was not responsible for the 
loss of control, blame and punishment are not justified on any theory of 
morality and criminal punishment.”26 When individuals act without volition, 
they are not liable for their actions. As Morse writes: 
Conviction and punishment are justified only if the defendant 
deserves them. The basic precondition for desert in all contexts, legal 
and otherwise, is the actor’s responsibility as a moral agent. Any 
condition or circumstance that sufficiently compromises 
responsibility must therefore negate desert; a just criminal law will 
incorporate such conditions and circumstances in its doctrines of 
excuse.27 
He further notes that “minimal rationality (a cognitive capacity) and minimal 
self-control or lack of compulsion (a volitional capacity) are the essential 
preconditions for responsibility.”28 However, Morse has argued that “[o]ut-of-
control” action does not mean, necessarily, “unintentional” action29 and has 
subjected defenses of “out of control” behavior to intense scrutiny. Indeed, he 
has suggested that “control” issues are largely understood as defects in rational 
thinking.30 
So, too, Peter Arenella has noted, “[T]he law’s account of moral agency is 
simply a description of those persons who have sufficient control over their 
behavior that they can make a rational choice about whether to comply with 
the minimal moral demands of the criminal law.”31 A critical assumption 
behind retribution is thus that an individual could have chosen not to engage in 
the act—could have controlled his own behavior—but instead chose to act 
despite an understanding that the behavior was wrong. Retributivists find no 
use for punishing someone who did not have the capacity to control himself or 
 
 25 Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and 
Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1518 (1992). 
 26 Morse, supra note 6, at 1587–88. 
 27 Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 
781 (1985). 
 28 Id. at 782. 
 29 Morse, supra note 6, at 1595. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Arenella, supra note 25, at 1584–85. 
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012  7:48 AM 
2012] CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-CONTROL 511 
to choose his actions. However, when someone has the capacity to control 
himself, but simply does not do so, he is culpable. 
3. Utilitarian/Law and Economics Perspective 
The law and economics vision of crime suggests that individuals choose to 
engage in certain behavior because the benefits outweigh the costs and that 
criminal law provides a set of deterrents against engaging in specific behavior. 
Thus deterrence provides society with a way to prevent crime by increasing the 
costs of criminal behavior.32 Under this account, criminal law’s job is to create 
sanctions such that “the criminal is made worse off by committing the act.”33 
An important assumption of deterrence theory is that individuals will weigh the 
costs of their behavior (punishment) against the benefits.34 This utilitarian 
theory is embraced by law and economics scholars who presume a rational 
actor who seeks to maximize utility. This rational actor will engage in an 
activity only when its benefits outweigh its costs. Thus the key challenge for 
criminal law is calibrating the punishment appropriately, as weighed against 
the benefits, to deter crime. The goal is to “set the expected punishment cost at 
a level that will not deter the occasional crime that is value maximizing.”35 
And volumes have been written on creating an optimal level of sanctions for 
deterrence purposes.36 
But deterrence only makes sense when, as a general matter, individuals can 
assess the consequences of their outcomes and choose their course of action 
accordingly: that is, when they are able to control their own behavior.37 The 
 
 32 POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 243. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Bellamy ed., 
Richard Davies trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 
2008). 
 35 POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 243. 
 36 See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1197 (2007); Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008); Steven Shavell, 
Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 
(1985); Avraham D. Tabbach, Does a Rise in Maximal Fines Increase or Decrease the Optimal Level of 
Deterrence?, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 53 (2009). 
 37 Although I have described the retributivist and utilitarian attitudes toward human control over one’s 
own actions as similar here, Joshua Dressler contrasts them, stating that “the premise of utilitarianism is that 
people are generally hedonistic and rational calculators,” whereas “retributivists focus on their view that 
humans generally possess free will or free choice and, therefore, may justly be blamed when they choose to 
violate society’s mores.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16 (5th ed. 2009) (footnote 
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012  7:48 AM 
512 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:501 
utilitarian view presumes that most people will engage in this rational 
calculation and decide not to engage in criminal behavior. Those who do 
engage in the prohibited behavior thus represent a problem for the utilitarian 
that must be explained in one of several ways: the crime was appropriately 
committed because its benefits did outweigh its harms;38 society failed to 
provide the appropriate level of deterrence;39 the individual miscalculated the 
cost–benefit equation; the individual had incomplete, missing, or wrong 
information about the costs and benefits; or the individual correctly calculated 
the equation but was unable to bring his behavior in line with the appropriate 
choice. 
This last instance, when an individual cannot bring his behavior into line 
with his rationally calculated choice, is difficult to reconcile with law and 
economics’ baseline assumptions. For example, in considering the case of an 
impulsive, heat of passion crime, Posner suggests not that the individual knew 
that the costs outweighed the benefits and yet could not control himself, but 
rather that the impulsive individual merely requires a higher level of sanctions 
in order to balance the equation properly.40 Heat of passion, that is, does not 
eliminate the possibility of self-control. It merely makes exercising control a 
less utility-maximizing choice, which thus requires a concomitant increase in 
punishment to reach deterrence levels. On the other hand, utilitarian theory 
acknowledges that the imposition of punishment for those who truly are not 
deterrable serves no function for deterrence purposes: hence a deterrence 
proponent has no use for punishing an individual who either cannot make an 
accurate cost–benefit analysis or cannot abide by this calculation’s mandate.41 
The utilitarian view suggests that there are few criminals who are not capable 
of controlling their actions to comport with their cost–benefit analyses but also 
suggests that those who are truly not able to exercise self-control are not 
 
omitted). Although Dressler’s description may be accurate, both perspectives do rely on an understanding of 
an individual who is able to choose. 
 38 See POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 242–43 (arguing that a starving man ought to steal a trivial amount 
of food from an unoccupied cabin in the woods). 
 39 See id. § 7.3, at 250–51 (arguing that the theory of criminal sanction is one of deterrence). 
 40 Id. § 7.4, at 257. On the other hand, Posner suggests that, because the impulsive criminal is less 
deterrable, perhaps society ought to “buy” less punishment for these individuals. Id. 
 41 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 561–62. Of course, generally speaking, a deterrence system has no 
particular interest in punishing any one criminal. Instead, “people are actually fined or imprisoned only to 
maintain the credibility of the deterrent.” POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.3, at 250. 
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appropriately punished under deterrence theory.42 In sum, the utilitarian model 
presumes self-control by the rational criminal actor. 
B. Criminal Law Doctrine 
Criminal law doctrine generally embraces the idea that individuals are 
culpable only when they act with intent and volition. A variety of criminal 
doctrines rely on the concept of “control” when determining culpability and 
punishment. While scholars debate the premise of true free will and explore the 
implications for criminal law of its existence or lack thereof, criminal law 
doctrine largely pushes these metaphysical questions off to the side, instead 
focusing on the individual’s relationship to the behavior in the moment. The 
basic underpinnings of criminal law, actus reus and mens rea, require 
intentional action. Prominently, the concept of self-control is also implicated in 
inquiries into whether the defendant is insane or, instead, must stand trial. Self-
control also plays a significant role in inquiries into whether conduct is 
justifiable or excusable. Finally, questions about self-control may arise in the 
context of mitigation or enhancement of punishment. I briefly demonstrate the 
role of self-control in these areas below. 
1. Self-Control and Involuntary Acts, Duress, and Mens Rea 
The language of involuntary acts, duress, and mens rea reflects a 
preoccupation with self-control as a factor in culpability. As numerous scholars 
have noted, an action that is truly outside of one’s ability to control cannot 
yield criminal responsibility. The actus reus requirement includes an insistence 
that an action be voluntary—a deliberate movement by one’s body is distinct, 
legally, from an involuntary physical movement. As Dressler explains, “With a 
voluntary act, a human being—a person—and not simply an organ of a human 
being, causes the bodily action.”43 Actions that are not the product of the 
brain’s conscious control lie outside the scope of the actus reus. 
 
 42 However, the system may need to impose punishment to remain credible for future offenders, and 
there still may be an independent need to imprison undeterrable criminals for the purpose of incapacitation. 
SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 562. As Shavell says: 
[I]n many cases where a person is not legally responsible for his act, he will be no less dangerous 
to society than if he were responsible. A person who has an uncontrollable urge to set fires, or 
who is subject to insane, violent rages, is dangerous to society even though he cannot help 
himself. 
Id. 
 43 DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 9.02, at 90. 
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However, in cases where there is duress applied by an outside force—for 
instance, a situation where someone has a gun to one’s head and insists that 
one perform a criminal act—it is clear that the party is acting rationally and is 
able to bring her actions in line with her rational preferences to continue, 
herself, to live. So, the criminal act is not the immediate product of a self-
control problem, per se. But because the circumstances that led to the criminal 
actor’s predicament are outside of her control, the law offers lesser culpability 
for these acts (except for those involving murder).44 
Intent and mens rea similarly work to ensure that the law limits criminal 
responsibility to those who mean to do wrong. The law requires a “culpable 
state of mind.”45 As Hart said, if we did not have responsibility as a principle, 
we should lose the ability which the present system in some degree 
guarantees to us, to predict and plan the future course of our lives 
within the coercive framework of the law. For the system which 
makes liability to the law’s sanctions dependent upon a voluntary act 
not only maximizes the power of the individual to determine by his 
choice his future fate; it also maximizes his power to identify in 
advance the space which will be left open to him free from the law’s 
interference.46 
The law does not take action unless there is the appropriate mens rea. This is a 
risk, and “[i]t is the price we pay for general recognition that a man’s fate 
should depend upon his choice and this is to foster the prime social virtue of 
self-restraint.”47 When someone lacks the capacity to make this choice—
whether from an inability to understand the facts of the conduct, comprehend 
that the conduct violates the law, or conform behavior to the requirements of 
the law—he does not deserve punishment.48 
2. Self-Control in Insanity 
The insanity defense is predicated on lack of self-control. If we accept, as 
Roscoe Pound says, “the starting point of the criminal law . . . that a criminal 
was a person possessed of free will who, having before him a choice between 
 
 44 Id. § 23.01, at 303–04. 
 45 Id. § 10.07, at 139, § 11.01, at 145–46. 
 46 H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 34, at 181–82. 
 47 Id. at 182. 
 48 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.03, at 346 (noting that just punishment depends on the rationality 
and self-control of the criminal who performed the crime). 
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right and wrong, had freely and deliberately chosen to go wrong,” then we are 
inexorably led to his conclusion that “it was evident that if mental disease 
inhibited or destroyed the will element or precluded the choice of right and 
wrong, there was no crime.”49 In essence, a criminal is a person who 
deliberately chooses to engage in behavior that he knows is wrong; we call this 
crime because the person could have chosen not to engage in the behavior. 
That is, that person could have exercised self-control over his actions and 
opted for a different choice. When that choice-making process is hampered, by 
whatever means, the system seeks ways to recategorize the resulting conduct. 
A variety of perspectives on criminal law support the existence of the 
insanity defense. For example, punishing those who are insane provides no 
deterrent effects. As Dressler says, “A person who does not know what she is 
doing or who cannot control her conduct cannot be deterred by the threat of 
criminal sanction.”50 And, similarly, moral retributivists may support the 
insanity defense because one cannot ascribe blame to severely mentally ill 
people for their behavior when they simply “lack the capacity to do what other 
humans are able to do: to act rationally or to control their behavior.”51 The 
exception of the insane person highlights our most basic presumption of free 
will: unless one is mentally diseased, we assume the capacity for free choice.52 
As Dressler explains, “[M]oral responsibility for one’s actions is dependent on 
the essential attributes of personhood, namely rationality and self-control.”53 
Insane people lack these “essential attributes of personhood” and are therefore 
not the appropriate subject of a moral evaluation.54 
There are several basic tests of insanity, all of which rely to some degree on 
a conception of the sane individual’s ability to control his actions. The 
M‘Naghten test states that a person is insane if, at the time of the act in 
question, he did not know the nature and quality of the act or did not know that 
the act was wrong.55 This means that individuals who know what they are 
doing, and that their act is wrong, are not insane. This test tracks a retributivist 
account of self-control: we only punish those who could have chosen not to do 
wrong. When an individual is unaware that particular acts are wrong, he does 
 
 49 ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 126–27 (1930). 
 50 DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.03, at 345. 
 51 Id. at 346. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 54 Id.; accord Morse, supra note 27, at 783. 
 55 M‘Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 722; 10 Clark & Finnelly 200. 
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not have the opportunity to try to bring his actions in line with the law, and so 
he is not legally responsible for those actions. Criticism of the M‘Naghten test 
has taken a self-control tack: the test does not include mental illnesses that 
affect volition, but only focuses on cognitive disability.56 The rule, the critics 
argue, does not adequately protect the individual who is “unable to control her 
behavior.”57 
In response to M‘Naghten, some jurisdictions added a third prong to correct 
this omission: the “irresistible impulse” test.58 This test tries to reach conduct 
that is apparently beyond the power of the actor to suppress, excusing the actor 
from culpability if the actor “acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable 
impulse,”59 the actor “lost the power to choose between the right and wrong,”60 
or the actions were beyond the control of the actor.61 This test can even cover 
planned behavior as long as the defendant “lacked the ability to control her 
conduct.”62 Self-control has been deeply criticized as the appropriate test for 
insanity63 because, as Dressler has noted, psychiatrists do not have an accurate 
measurement device for the capacity for self-control,64 but it nonetheless 
remains a common thread in judicial discussion of insanity. 
Another test for insanity comes from the American Law Institute’s Model 
Penal Code. There, a person is not responsible for his criminal conduct if, as a 
result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity “to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.”65 From the self-control perspective, this 
test suggests that if an individual has a mental defect such that she lacks the 
ability to control her own conduct, she will not be held responsible for her 
actions by reason of insanity. The federal insanity rule hews to the M‘Naghten 
test66 but adds that it must be that the individual cannot appreciate the nature or 
 
 56 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.04, at 352. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See id. at 353 (citing Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 751 (2006)). 
 59 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 60 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 1887)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
 61 Id. (citing Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897)). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Morse, supra note 27. 
 64 DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.04, at 354 (citing United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 
1984) (en banc)). 
 65 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) (alteration in original). 
 66 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 356. 
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quality of the act or its wrongfulness by virtue of a severe mental disease or 
defect.67 Insanity defenses are not, of course, simply a binary test of whether 
an individual lacked self-control.68 Many individuals who lack control over 
their behavior in some way are not criminally insane; indeed, very few 
defendants are excused from liability through the insanity defense. However, 
defendants found insane do, by and large, share the characteristic that they are 
not able to exercise self-control. 
3. Self-Control in Justification and Excuse 
There are many defendants who fail to meet the definition for insanity but 
are nonetheless mentally compromised in some way that the criminal law 
believes should make a difference with respect to culpability. In particular, as I 
describe below, several doctrines suggest lesser culpability for those who are 
not fully in control of their actions. I do not make an effort here to classify 
justifications, excuses, defenses, or mistakes, or to offer a taxonomy of these 
items. There are others who have undertaken that project,69 and the distinction 
between justification and excuse is one that has received much scholarly 
attention.70 The only aspect of these concepts critical to my analysis here is 
how these doctrines understand and rely on self-control as a guiding principle. 
My purpose is simply to address a variety of the ways in which criminal law 
incorporates its concern about an individual’s ability to control her actions. I 
consider below the role of self-control in the context of provocation and 
intoxication. 
 
 67 The product test, also called the Durham test, stated that whenever a person’s behavior is the product 
of a mental disease or defect, the person should not be held liable by reason of insanity. Durham v. United 
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(en banc), superseded by statute, Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241–4247 (2006)), as recognized in Shannon v. United States, 512 
U.S. 573 (1994). This test has been abandoned. See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 973 (adopting the Model Penal Code 
test). Its purpose was to streamline the test for insanity in order to give mental health professionals freer rein to 
testify about a defendant’s insanity without parsing the defendant’s volitional or cognitive abilities. See 
DRESSLER, supra 37, at 355. 
 68 For example, Pennsylvania courts expressly include lack of self-control in their definition of what 
insanity is not: “Certainly neither social maladjustment, nor lack of self-control, nor impulsiveness, nor 
psychoneurosis, nor emotional instability, nor chronic malaria, nor all of such conditions combined, constitute 
insanity within the criminal-law conception of that term.” Commonwealth v. Neill, 67 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. 
1949). 
 69 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 
203 (1982). 
 70 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1 (2003); 
Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986); Kent 
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984). 
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a. Provocation 
The very definition of provocation relies on a notion of the possibility of 
losing control of one’s actions. One typical definition suggests that provocation 
is “adequate” if it is “sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his 
actions and his reason,”71 indicating the law’s reliance on a 
reasonable/ordinary person standard in determining when provocation is 
adequate. Dressler explains that there are two ways this plays out: first, one 
measures the gravity of the provocation to the reasonable/ordinary person, and 
second, one measures the level of self-control to be expected of a 
reasonable/ordinary person.72 
The law and theory surrounding provocation, or heat of passion,73 is 
perhaps the most obvious place in criminal law where the rational actor model 
clashes directly with moral theorists’ vision; this clash occurs precisely 
because of the question of control inherent in the doctrine. The rational actor 
model suggests that the greater the provocation, the less deterrable the criminal 
actor will be. That is, the immediate benefit to the enraged, provoked actor will 
outweigh the regular sanction, whereas the immediate utility to a nonenraged, 
nonprovoked actor will not.74 The utilitarian model does not readily yield to 
the potential for an actor whose actions seem “out of control” because of 
provocation; instead, the suggestion is just that the utility calculation for these 
individuals looks different. For a moral theorist, however, the “out of control” 
question is one that directly implicates the degree of blameworthiness, and it is 
partially for that reason that so much has been written on the question of 
whether provocation is a justification (something that means that the act in 
response is not wrong) or an excuse (in which case the act is wrong, but not 
quite as blameworthy as it might otherwise be).75 The nature of the inquiry into 
whether provocation is an excuse or justification stems from the kind of 
 
 71 State v. Guebara, 696 P.2d 381, 385 (Kan. 1985) (citing State v. Coop, 573 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Kan. 
1978)). 
 72 DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 31.07, at 539. 
 73 There are four basic elements to a provocation/heat of passion claim. First, the actor must act in the 
heat of passion; second, the passion must have resulted from adequate provocation; third, “the actor must not 
have had a reasonable opportunity to cool off”; and finally, “there must be a causal link between the 
provocation, the passion, and the homicide.” Id. at 535 (citing Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (Md. 
1991)). 
 74 See POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 242. 
 75 See Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Explaining and Justifying the Defense in Partial Excuse, Loss of 
Self-Control Terms, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 319 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that 
justification serves as a partial defense). 
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control the individual had over his behavior. So, for example, Reid Fontaine 
explains that from an excuse perspective, the person who is provoked and 
experiences “substantial emotional upset,” without which “he would not have 
lost self-control,” is punished less than the person who “maintains his control 
despite being seriously provoked” because “the provocation-resistant person is 
controlled and rational when he kills the provoker.”76 Under a justification 
theory, however, the degree of provocation is important regardless of whether 
the actor experiences the subsequent emotional upheaval that leads to a loss of 
control.77 
Some states have adopted new, broader terminology meant to encompass 
provocation and heat of passion. Specifically, the Model Penal Code provides 
that a homicide that would be classified as murder without some special 
circumstances can be considered manslaughter if committed as the result of 
“extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse.”78 Again, self-control plays a role in providing the 
defendant with a partial defense for his behavior. So, for example, in New 
York a court may allow a defendant to exercise an “extreme emotional 
disturbance defense,” which requires that the defendant produce “evidence that 
he or she suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity at 
the time of the homicide, typically manifested by a loss of self-control.”79 The 
law suggests that there are some emotional responses that will so overwhelm 
someone’s ability to think rationally that we may reasonably say that such a 
person is unable to control his own actions because of his emotional distress. 
States are not uniform in their approaches to extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance, and many do not permit the use of this defense.80 
 
 76 Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification, 
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 45–46 (2009). 
 77 See Dressler, supra note 75. 
 78 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985). 
 79 People v. Smith, 808 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting People v. Roche, 772 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 
(N.Y. 2002)). “The defense requires proof of a subjective element, that defendant acted under an extreme 
emotional disturbance, and an objective element, that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the 
emotional disturbance.” Id. (citing People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. 1985)). 
 80 See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification and 
Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2011). Only eleven states have adopted the extreme 
emotional or mental disturbance language of the Model Penal Code. See id. at 1044. 
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b. Intoxication 
Although it is clear that being under the influence of drugs or alcohol can 
impair one’s ability to control one’s behavior, courts have been unwilling to 
allow defendants to evade culpability on this ground.81 For example, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court is quite typical in its ruling that loss of self-control 
caused by voluntary intoxication provides no basis for the insanity defense.82 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court determined that a state’s statutory 
prohibition against considering voluntary intoxication in determining the 
existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense did not 
violate the Due Process Clause.83 Despite the fact that the intoxication did 
reduce the individual’s self-control, the Court held that the state need not 
consider this information.84 As Justice Ginsburg wrote, it did not violate the 
Constitution for the statutory regime to adjudge “that two people are equally 
culpable where one commits an act stone sober, and the other engages in the 
same conduct after his voluntary intoxication has reduced his capacity for self-
control.”85 The Court further stated that addiction does not offer a viable 
defense to criminal responsibility when someone commits criminal acts under 
the influence of a chemical to which he is addicted.86 
For the rational actor, there are several choices for how to think about an 
intoxication defense under a deterrence model. First, the rational actor ought to 
include, in his original cost–benefit analysis regarding the use of alcohol or 
drugs, the possibility of committing an undesirable criminal act because of that 
use. For deterrence purposes, this could deter the substance abuse that would 
have otherwise led to the criminal behavior. Alternatively, the utilitarian might 
say that if an intoxicated individual truly cannot comprehend the costs and 
benefits, or control his behavior to comport with his calculation, then 
deterrence is not possible, and so there is no need for punishment. 
A moral theorist, instead, might suggest that because the actor had the 
initial choice to engage in behavior that led to the wrongful act, he must be 
 
 81 But see DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 326 (“Although it is true that self-induced intoxication as such 
never excuses wrongdoing, the condition that intoxication causes, e.g., a clouded mental state, 
unconsciousness, or insanity, may serve as an exculpatory basis in very limited circumstances.”). 
 82 See State v. Kolisnitschenko, 267 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Wis. 1978). 
 83 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
 84 See id. 
 85 Id. at 57 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 86 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 24.02, at 348 (“The common law treats intoxication resulting from 
alcoholism or drug addiction as voluntary.”). 
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held responsible for his actions.87 A moral theorist may distinguish between 
situations in which the actor engaged in behavior unwittingly or deliberately.88 
Our general societal stance toward drug and alcohol use, which suggests 
individual choice as the basic paradigm,89 typically helps us to place the 
unplanned consequences of a state of being that we have deliberately entered 
into in a special category. That is, although we may lack control over our 
actions while under the influence of a chemical substance, we believe that we 
had control over the action of taking the chemical substance, and so we do not 
lessen liability for those later actions.90 
Newer research on the possible genetic and biological roots of addiction 
has provided a potential critique of the free will assumption underlying the 
refusal to lessen culpability for intoxication or drug use.91 Nonetheless, 
although there may be an impulse to take drugs or consume alcohol that is 
extraordinarily difficult to resist—perhaps just as (or more) difficult for some 
to resist as an impulse in the face of provocation—the law considers drug and 
alcohol use differently. As one criminal law scholar has said, “[W]e virtually 
never know whether the agent is in some sense genuinely unable or is simply 
unwilling to resist[.] . . . [R]esearch evidence concerning the characteristics 
that help people maintain control when faced with temptation or experiencing 
impulses is no more than a general guide.”92 Concerns about control permeate 
 
 87 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of 
Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1985). 
 88 See id. at 31–34. 
 89 The widely popular “Just Say No” anti-drug ad campaign of the 1980s and 1990s is one example of 
this attitude toward substance abuse, suggesting that personal choice and responsibility are the main 
determinants of drug use. See, e.g., Jerome Beck, 100 Years of “Just Say No” Versus “Just Say Know”: 
Reevaluating Drug Education Goals for the Coming Century, 22 EVALUATION REV. 15 (1998). 
 90 Courts have acknowledged that addiction can be considered a type of disease, which suggests that its 
consequences are beyond the momentary control of the individual; attempts to punish individuals for the status 
of addiction, rather than for the act of using drugs or for acts undertaken while under their influence, have not 
succeeded. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Nonetheless, courts have largely been 
unwilling to exempt the taking of drugs, or acts undertaken under their influence, from criminal liability, even 
when addiction leads to these events. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (refusing to hold that acts 
committed while under the influence of alcohol, even if the defendant were an alcoholic, were exempted from 
criminal responsibility); Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2245, 2309 (1992) (noting that, following the decision in Powell, most courts have refused to hold that 
acts committed while under the influence of alcohol or drugs were exempted from criminal liability, even if 
the defendant suffered from addiction). 
 91 See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
165, 169–72 (2006) (describing a strand of modern addiction research as “treat[ing] the intentional conduct of 
the addict solely as the product of brain mechanisms”). 
 92 Id. at 187. 
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the discussion surrounding intoxication defenses but point to a different result 
than in some other areas of law because of our lay perception that the decision 
to become intoxicated is within the control of the ordinary person.93 
4. Self-Control in Mitigation of Punishment 
Responsibility for criminal behavior is taken into account not just at the 
time of determining what crime a particular defendant will be charged with or 
what defenses are available to him but also in sentencing.94 When a crime has 
been committed in a manner that somehow implicates an inability to control 
one’s actions, the criminal may receive a lesser punishment than others.95 As 
noted above, this supports a retributive vision of the law: we do not want to 
punish someone who lacked the ability to control his own actions because that 
person did not freely choose to engage in wrongdoing.96 There is also a 
utilitarian defense for offering lesser punishment; as noted above, it is perhaps 
an unwise investment in society’s resources to spend money on sanctions that 
are not able to offer future deterrence.97 
For example, in death penalty eligible cases, a defendant’s degree of 
responsibility as determined by the jury plays a role in determining whether or 
not the death penalty should be imposed. In the sentencing phase of death 
penalty eligible cases, the defense and the prosecution both seek to present 
evidence about the defendant’s character and crime that goes beyond 
establishing culpability.98 The prosecution presents aggravating factors in an 
effort to show just how bad the defendant’s actions were, and the defense 
presents mitigating factors in an effort to reduce blameworthiness for the 
defendant’s actions.99 Death penalty mitigation typically involves an effort by 
 
 93 See Robinson, supra note 87, at 7–8. 
 94 For example, federal sentencing guidelines allow for a downward departure in sentencing when 
individuals have “significantly reduced mental capacity” that might render them incapable of being fully 
responsible for their actions. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2011). 
 95 See id. § 5K2.12–.13 (providing for lesser punishment when the defendant is unable to control his  
actions due to coercion and duress, or diminished mental capacity). 
 96 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 97 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. As previously noted, this is perhaps counterintuitive to 
the insight of the law and economics scholar who suggests that, because the impulsive person is harder to 
deter, he should face a greater sanction. 
 98 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976). 
 99 Id. However, mitigating and aggravating factors are not always easy for jurors to distinguish. See 
Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating 
Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 410 (1990). 
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the defense to provide “humanizing and explanatory evidence” that will justify 
a reduction in punishment.100 
A defendant’s medical history, for example, may suggest problems from 
conception onward that could include neurological defects, mental retardation, 
fetal alcohol syndrome, chemical dependencies, or a wide variety of other 
mental health disorders that do not rise to the level of insanity but nonetheless 
suggest to the jury that the defendant was in some way incapable of exercising 
full agency in deciding to commit the crime in question.101 Similarly, 
documenting the “extensive poverty, neglect, and abuse”102 that may have 
characterized the defendant’s childhood, and such conditions’ negative long-
term effects, also may suggest to a judge and jury that the defendant’s capacity 
to exercise control over his actions was diminished. The reduction in 
punishment that mitigation strives for is rooted in self-control: an individual 
who was afflicted with these medical conditions, or who had this kind of 
upbringing, the argument goes, is simply unable to make the same choices and 
exert the same control over his actions that another person might, and thus 
should not be punished in the same manner. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ON 
SELF-CONTROL 
The self is the basic building block of human society and human 
interaction. Social psychologists consider that the self comprises three distinct 
strands of experience: reflexive consciousness, which is about one’s own 
construction of a concept of who one is; interpersonal being, which 
encompasses experiences, behaviors, and relationships; and finally, the 
executive function, which describes the self’s job as a decision maker and 
agent.103 The ability to control one’s behavior and emotions is of particular 
interest to psychologists: without this executive function, “the self would be a 
mere helpless spectator of events, of minimal use or importance.”104 This latter 
function was for many years the least studied of the three aspects of the self, 
 
 100 Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster’s Mental Health and Social History: Why Capital Defense 
Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units Require the Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 23, 52 (2005). 
 101 Id. at 53–54. 
 102 Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 345 (2009). 
 103 Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680, 680 (Daniel T. 
Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 104 Id. 
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but it has garnered more attention in recent years as research on self-regulation 
and self-control has gained momentum.105 
Self-regulation research began in the 1980s, initially growing out of 
learning theory: just as rats might respond to a set of rewards and punishments 
set up by a laboratory scientist, so too researchers thought that an individual 
might devise her own set of rewards and punishments to induce or to 
discourage certain behavior of her own.106 Self-regulation researchers have 
studied how individuals regulate their thoughts, actions, impulses, and 
feelings.107 Researchers have sought to understand why some individuals are 
able to self-regulate toward future goals and away from undesirable activity, 
while others find such self-regulation difficult.108 And researchers have 
focused energy on how self-regulation affects individuals and society.109 
Research has demonstrated that a lack of self-control is associated with a 
wide range of negative outcomes, while high levels of self-control predict a 
host of positive outcomes. Walter Mischel’s work on delayed gratification is 
seminal in this area: he found that the ability to delay gratification in early 
childhood is implicated in many of our most cherished long-term goals, such as 
graduating from college or completing large projects at work.110 The ability to 
delay gratification is implicated any time a large but delayed reward awaits 
someone who forgoes momentary rewards: that is, in short, most of the time in 
our lives. Developmental psychologists have identified this trait, which is 
sometimes called “effortful control,” or the ability to inhibit a dominant 
response in order to perform a subdominant response, as an important 
 
 105 See id. at 712. As Baumeister explains, it may be that, because so much of the executive function is not 
dramatic, instead consisting of many small decisions that are easily understood as guided by the rational 
pursuit of self-interest, it has been understudied. Accordingly, Baumeister notes, “[T]here has been something 
of a premium put on finding ways in which people act contrary to their rational self-interest”—hence the surge 
of interest in research on heuristics, biases, and other nonrational decision-making processes. Id. This research 
“reveal[s] flaws in the executive function” and for that reason helps us understand how the executive function 
works. Id. at 713. Throughout this Article, following the lead of scholars in the field, I use the terms self-
control and self-regulation interchangeably. 
 106 Id. at 716. 
 107 Id. at 717. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See, e.g., Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel & Philip K. Peake, Predicting Adolescent Cognitive and Self-
Regulatory Competencies from Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identifying Diagnostic Conditions, 26 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 978, 982 (1990) (finding that very young children’s capacity to delay their 
gratification in the face of a potential reward significantly correlated with higher SAT scores over a decade 
later). 
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dimension of temperament in children.111 Psychologists have suggested that 
effortful control, which includes the ability to control one’s attention, to inhibit 
certain behaviors, and, sometimes, to activate other behaviors, plays a critical 
role in regulating individual emotion.112 Effortful control helps individuals 
distract themselves from negative emotions and inhibits the expression of 
negative emotions or behavioral expressions of those emotions.113 
Research has shown that low effortful control in children is expressly 
linked to negative qualities such as higher impulsivity.114 High effortful control 
in children is also linked to compliance—particularly compliance that is 
internally motivated rather than situationally required and that seeks to 
suppress a particular behavior rather than initiate or sustain a behavior.115 
Effortful control is also positively related to other positive dimensions of moral 
development, such as conscience,116 empathy,117 and prosocial behavior.118 
Control and its absence continue to matter as children grow up: at age 
eighteen, individuals who are low in self-control are more impulsive, danger 
seeking, aggressive, and interpersonally alienated.119 By twenty-one, low self-
control is related to an individual’s number of criminal convictions.120 
Longitudinal studies suggest that the problem of self-control has an important 
 
 111 See Nancy Eisenberg et al., Effortful Control: Relations with Emotion Regulation, Adjustment, and 
Socialization in Childhood, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 
263, 263 (Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy F. Baumeister eds., 2d ed. 2011) (quoting Mary K. Rothbart & John E. 
Bates, Temperament, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, AND PERSONALITY 
DEVELOPMENT 99, 129 (William Damon et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006)). 
 112 Id. at 264. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 270. 
 115 Id. at 268. 
 116 Grazyna Kochanska & Amy Knaack, Effortful Control as a Personality Characteristic of Young 
Children: Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences, 71 J. PERSONALITY 1087, 1102 (2003) (finding that 
higher effortful control in small children predicted a more internalized conscience). 
 117 See, e.g., Ivanna K. Gurthrie et al., The Relations of Regulation and Emotionality to Children’s 
Situational Empathy-Related Responding, 21 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 87 (1997) (finding that children high in 
effortful control demonstrated more facial sadness while watching a sad movie than children low in effortful 
control). 
 118 See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg et al., The Relations of Children’s Dispositional Prosocial Behavior to 
Emotionality, Regulation, and Social Functioning, 67 CHILD DEV. 974 (1996); Nancy Eisenberg et al., The 
Relations of Regulation and Emotionality to Resiliency and Competent Social Functioning in Elementary 
School Children, 68 CHILD DEV. 295 (1997). 
 119 Avshalom Caspi & Phil A. Silva, Temperamental Qualities at Age Three Predict Personality Traits in 
Young Adulthood: Longitudinal Evidence from a Birth Cohort, 66 CHILD DEV. 486, 495 (1995). 
 120 Bill Henry et al., Staying in School Protects Boys with Poor Self-Regulation in Childhood from Later 
Crime: A Longitudinal Study, 23 INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 1049, 1067 (1999). 
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relationship with crime: low self-control at age fourteen predicted criminal 
offenses at twenty and thirty-two.121 Self-control is directly linked to criminal 
behavior, and it is also linked to the correlate of addiction and substance 
abuse.122 Because drug use is itself unlawful and being under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol is a significant predicate for many criminal activities,123 this is 
yet another way that self-control failure is implicated in criminal behavior. 
Indeed, psychologist Travis Hirschi has argued that the most important 
individual-level trait of relevance to an individual’s propensity to commit a 
crime is self-control; the commonality among all criminal acts is the provision 
of “immediate benefit at the risk of long-term pain.”124 Hirschi and Michael 
Gottfredson posit that criminal behavior, in contexts as diverse as juvenile 
delinquency, violent crime, and white collar crime, is based almost wholly on a 
lack of self-control.125 
While some psychologists have focused on identifying the negative and 
positive effects of self-control on emotions and behavior, others have been 
working to formulate an understanding of how the process of controlling 
oneself actually works. Of particular interest to psychologists is how 
individuals self-regulate to minimize their engagement in undesirable behavior 
and maximize their engagement in desirable behavior.126 The executive 
function of the self means that there are few behaviors that we truly lack the 
capacity to control, according to psychologists; as psychologist and self-
control researcher Roy Baumeister has noted, there are almost no “irresistible 
 
 121 See Lea Pulkkinen, Offensive and Defensive Aggression in Humans: A Longitudinal Perspective, 13 
AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 197, 203–04 (1987); Lea Pulkkinen, Self-Control and Continuity from Childhood to Late 
Adolescence, in 4 LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 63 (Paul B. Baltes & Orville G. Brim, Jr. eds., 
1982). 
 122 See Jay G. Hull & Laurie B. Slone, Alcohol and Self-Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: 
RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 466 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 
2004); Michael A. Sayette & Kasey M. Griffin, Self-Regulatory Failure and Addiction, in HANDBOOK OF 
SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 505. 
 123 See Kathryn D. Scott et al., The Role of Alcohol in Physical Assault Perpetration and Victimization, 60 
J. STUD. ALCOHOL 198 (1999) (finding a strong relationship between alcohol use and physical assault 
perpetration); Samantha Wells et al., Alcohol-Related Aggression in the General Population, 61 J. STUD. 
ALCOHOL 626 (2000) (finding that alcohol intoxication is associated with increased levels of physical 
aggression); Helene Raskin White et al., Problem Drinking and Intimate Partner Violence, 63 J. STUD. 
ALCOHOL 205 (2002) (finding that problem drinking is significantly associated with intimate partner violence 
perpetration). 
 124 Travis Hirschi, Self-Control and Crime, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, 
AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 537, 537; accord MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A 
GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 88 (1990). 
 125 GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 124, at 88–91. 
 126 See Baumeister, supra note 103, at 717. 
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impulses,” demonstrated by the fact that few serial killers take action when an 
armed officer is present.127 In any event, Baumeister suggests that it is not the 
impulse itself that must be controlled, because impulses are automatic 
responses to particular stimuli.128 Instead, resistance to the natural 
consequences of the impulse is the key to self-control.129 How, then, do 
individuals regulate their behavior and resist acting on impulses to engage in 
certain behavior, and how, conversely, do individuals choose effortfully to 
engage in other behavior? 
In the past twenty years, psychologists have been particularly interested in 
questions about how self-regulation works. Some researchers have suggested 
that self-control represents a triumph of effortful cognition over automatic 
behavior,130 while others have suggested that self-control describes behavior 
governed by “cool,” cognitive behavior, rather than “hot,” affective, or 
impulsive responses.131 Still others have characterized self-control as behavior 
that is in accordance with rational preferences, rather than visceral reactions.132 
And others have noted that self-control requires actions that comport with 
long-term, rather than short-term, goals.133 
Although different, these various theories are not completely conceptually 
unrelated; they all similarly describe a struggle between two types of behavior: 
on one side, the automatic, “hot,” or visceral short-term-benefit choice, and on 
the other, the cognitively effortful, “cool,” or rational long-term-benefit choice. 
Taken together, the varying theories offer a useful picture of some classic self-
control challenges. For example, consider smoking. Smoking may represent a 
failure of self-control because even when one consciously wants not to smoke, 
one’s automatic response may be to light up a cigarette. So, too, smoking may 
appeal to the “hot,” affective system and may satisfy a visceral urge, rather 
than being a cognitively effortful, “cool,” rational preference. And finally, 
 
 127 Roy F. Baumeister, Yielding to Temptation: Self-Control Failure, Impulsive Purchasing, and 
Consumer Behavior, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 670, 671 (2002). 
 128 Roy F. Baumeister & Todd F. Heatherton, Self-Regulation Failure: An Overview, 7 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 
1, 2 (1996). 
 129 Id.; Baumeister, supra note 127, at 671. 
 130 See Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128. 
 131 See Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of Gratification: 
Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 3 (1999). 
 132 See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 288–89 (1996). 
 133 See Kentaro Fujita et al., Construal Levels and Self-Control, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 351, 
353–55 (2006). 
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smoking may satisfy a short-term goal of enjoying the experience, but it will 
fail to satisfy a long-term goal of good health. Similarly, foregoing a fun 
activity such as watching a movie in order to work and accomplish long-term 
career goals, or engaging in an unpleasant action such as a painful medical 
procedure because of its long-term positive health outcome, may likewise 
involve overriding and replacing automatic or impulsive behavior with more 
cognitively taxing behavior. This cognitively taxing behavior permits 
individuals to act in line with their long-term, rather than short-term, goals. 
Why are some individuals able to comport themselves in line with long-
term goals or cognitively effortful, “cool,” rational preferences, while others 
are overwhelmed by “hot,” visceral impulses or the lure of the short-term 
benefit? The psychological self-control literature has developed a three-stage 
model for how individuals comport their behavior to their wishes—that is, how 
they exercise control over their actions.134 First, one must have standards—that 
is, some kind of benchmark of ideals or goals.135 A lack of standards, 
conflicting standards, or confusion about the relevant standard will impede 
self-regulatory efforts;136 so, too, setting an inappropriately high or low 
standard can interfere with self-regulation.137 Second, one must monitor one’s 
behavior to examine whether or not it comports with one’s benchmark.138 
Monitoring requires one to keep a close tab on one’s behavior; so, for instance, 
behavior that reduces one’s ability to self-monitor, such as drinking alcohol, 
can impede self-regulation in other areas.139 Finally, one must be able to 
engage in what psychologists call “operating” behavior: that is, actually 
altering the behavior that does not measure up to the benchmark so that it 
 
 134 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 2. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Robert A. Emmons & Laura A. King, Conflict Among Personal Strivings: Immediate and Long-
Term Implications for Psychological and Physical Well-Being, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1040, 
1045–47 (1988) (finding that conflict between personal striving and ambivalence results in negative 
psychological and health effects, which supports a connection between personal strivings and personality); 
Elizabeth Van Hook & E. Tory Higgins, Self-Related Problems Beyond the Self-Concept: Motivational 
Consequences of Discrepant Self-Guides, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 625, 632 (1988) (finding that 
individuals who possess conflicting standards are more likely to experience psychological distress, which 
“emphasizes the importance of self-evaluative standards in self-guidance and self-assessment”). 
 137 Todd F. Heatherton & Nalini Ambady, Self-Esteem, Self-Prediction, and Living Up to Commitments, 
in SELF-ESTEEM: THE PUZZLE OF LOW SELF-REGARD 131 (Roy F. Baumeister ed., 1993). 
 138 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 2. 
 139 Id. 
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comports with the relevant standard.140 This feedback model is well established 
as a basic premise of self-control research.141 
The two most intriguing and dominant lines of recent self-control research 
in modern social psychology concern how individuals evaluate present versus 
future consequences, and under what circumstances the individual is able to 
bring her behavior into line with her desires. This first line of research—on 
“construal level theory”—attempts to unpack the mechanisms of self-control 
by looking at the implications of differences in the way people process 
information about events that will occur at different times. The second line of 
research—under the umbrella of the “strength” model of self-control—looks at 
the conditions under which self-control does and does not occur, suggesting 
that because self-control requires such a level of cognitive effort, it is a limited 
resource that becomes depleted over time. I consider these two perspectives, 
respectively, in Parts III and IV below, along with their implications for 
criminal law and theory. 
III.  CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY 
A. Research on Construal Level Theory 
Focusing closely on the tension between short-term goals or impulses and 
long-term goals or rational preferences that inheres in self-control problems, 
social psychologists have tried to understand how people may think differently 
about near-future and distant-future events to determine if that difference can 
account for self-control successes and failures. “Construal level theory” in 
psychology has tried to integrate previous theories about this tension into a 
coherent theoretical framework by suggesting that the reason people fail in 
their efforts to act in accordance with long-term goals is because of systematic 
differences in how people tend to conceptualize events depending on 
psychological distance from the event. (Although psychological distance can 
 
 140 Id. This understanding of self-control processes was strongly influenced by earlier work by Charles S. 
Carver and Michael F. Scheier that merged cybernetic theory with self-awareness theory to suggest that self-
regulation operates in a “TOTE” feedback loop: Test how one is doing against a standard, Operate on the self 
to change behavior to better comport with the standard, Test again to see how performance now compares to 
the standard, and Exit when one has reached the appropriate level of behavior. See CHARLES S. CARVER & 
MICHAEL F. SCHEIER, ATTENTION AND SELF-REGULATION: A CONTROL-THEORY APPROACH TO HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 16 (1981). Such a feedback loop could also work to effectuate a goal of increasing distance 
between oneself and a negative standard. See id. at 17. There may be important differences in the way that the 
self regulates toward and against standards, but this has been relatively underexplored empirically. 
 141 Baumeister, supra note 103, at 717. 
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include factors like social distance, most typically it is described as temporal 
distance.142) 
Construal level theory suggests that people typically construe events in the 
distant future at a “high” level, thinking about those events broadly and in an 
abstract way.143 These “high-level construals” encapsulate the central, defining 
features that convey the essential meaning of the event.144 In contrast, “low-
level construals” capture the concrete, specific, mundane features of the 
event.145 For an example, imagine a high-level construal of the Thanksgiving 
holiday—say, the importance of friends and family and appreciation of one’s 
blessings—contrasted with a low-level construal—what time the turkey needs 
to go in the oven or how to fit twelve people at a table for eight. The high-level 
construal would be what one might experience in thinking about the holiday 
during August, and the low-level construal is what one experiences in late 
November. 
In one set of studies, researchers first primed participants to think either in 
low-level or high-level ways about a particular topic by asking some 
participants to focus on reasons for maintaining good health or personal 
relationships (typically invoking abstract concepts) and asking others to focus 
on how one might maintain good health or good personal relationships 
(typically bringing to the fore a variety of concrete steps that one needs to 
take).146 In one part of the research, participants then assigned monetary value 
to a variety of items, both for receiving the items immediately and for 
receiving the items months into the future. When individuals were primed with 
low-level construal rather than high-level construal, they demonstrated a 
significant preference for immediate over delayed rewards, while individuals 
who were primed with high-level construal were less likely to prefer the 
immediate reward.147 The researchers concluded that, because of the 
demonstrated difference in willingness to delay rewards, high-level construal 
helps individuals exercise self-control.148 In another part of this research, the 
participants were asked to squeeze a handgrip for as long as possible, with the 
 
 142 See, e.g., Kentaro Fujita, Seeing the Forest Beyond the Trees: A Construal-Level Approach to Self-
Control, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1475 (2008); Nira Liberman et al., The Effect of 
Temporal Distance on Level of Mental Construal, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 523, 532 (2002). 
 143 Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403, 405 (2003). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Fujita et al., supra note 133, at 354. 
 147 Id. at 354–55. 
 148 Id. at 355. 
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promise that the longer they persisted, the more accurate self-relevant feedback 
they would receive on their performance in the experiment. Here, individuals 
primed with a high level of construal held the handgrip for a significantly 
longer time period than individuals who were primed with low-level 
construal.149 Again, because participants had to maintain control over their 
handgrip performance—to persist at a fairly unpleasant task to achieve 
accurate feedback—the researchers concluded that high-level construal helps 
to facilitate self-control.150 
In another set of studies, individuals who imagined scenarios described in 
high-level terms were more likely to predict that they would feel bad indulging 
in temptation than those who imagined scenarios described in low-level 
terms.151 That is, potential self-control failure appeared to be more upsetting to 
individuals who imagined the failure through a high-level lens. Other studies 
have suggested that individuals’ preferences as to events in the distant future 
tend to reflect greater self-control than those in the near future,152 which, when 
considered in conjunction with research on temporal construal, suggests that 
high-level construal may be a driver of self-control. 
Construal level theory has been offered as one potential explanation for the 
robust findings on hyperbolic discounting that have emerged from 
experimental work in economics.153 Hyperbolic discounting describes a 
general tendency to weigh events in the present or near future more heavily 
than those in the more distant future.154 Construal level theory suggests that 
hyperbolic discounting may take place because “the rich, detailed, and possibly 
ambiguous information contained in real events is represented more abstractly, 
in terms of relatively simple and structured mental models, when the events are 
 
 149 Id. at 356. 
 150 Id. at 357. 
 151 Id. at 363. 
 152 See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME 57, 58 (George 
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); Antonio L. Freitas et al., Abstract and Concrete Self-Evaluative Goals, 
80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 410, 417 (2001). 
 153 See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 445–46 (1997) 
(defining hyperbolic-discount functions as those characterized by a high discount rate over short horizons and 
a low discount rate over long horizons). 
 154 See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985) 
(suggesting that temporal discounting is important in explaining criminality because the benefits of crime 
occur at a different time than its costs); David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia 28 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11491, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w11491.pdf. 
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expected in the distant future than in the future.”155 While hyperbolic 
discounting suggests that individuals place more emphasis on near-term events 
than far-term events, construal level theory adds an additional layer: the events 
are not just weighted differentially, they are also conceptualized differently. 
Construal level theory suggests that the individual contemplating committing a 
criminal act construes events in the near-term and long-term in fundamentally 
distinct ways that can produce a systematic bias in evaluation. 
The difference between construal level theory and hyperbolic discounting 
is subtle but important. Take, for example, a person contemplating an armed 
robbery. Hyperbolic discounting means that when that person weighs the 
benefits of the crime (money) against the possible sanction (prison), he will 
discount the future sanction by some order of magnitude because it is going to 
occur, if ever, in the future. This means that even if the costs of prison were 
commensurate with or outweighed the benefits of the robbery, the costs of 
prison as computed might not outweigh the benefits after these costs were 
discounted because they would occur in the future. But construal level theory 
suggests that the individual would contemplate the immediate act and the 
future sanction in fundamentally different ways. The immediate act would be 
most likely construed in its low-level way—for example, what actions are 
needed to effect the robbery or what immediate benefit it will produce. The 
high-level construal of the act—its wrongfulness or the potential for serious 
harm to any of the participants or others—is likely to be less salient. In 
contrast, the potential future sanction is likely to be construed in broad terms—
abstract punishment for wrongdoing—rather than in its specific, concrete terms 
of imprisonment, daily isolation from family and friends, difficult prison 
conditions, etc. Rather than performing a simple cost–benefit analysis (even 
one that is “wrong” due to hyperbolic discounting), the potential criminal actor 
is comparing dramatically different factors that may be hard to translate into a 
cost–benefit equation. 
Temporal construal also may affect rational probability estimates, further 
casting doubt on the accuracy of the law and economics vision of a potential 
criminal actor’s cost–benefit analysis. Recent research on construal level 
theory and probability has begun to suggest that high-level construal may 
actually reduce individuals’ estimates about the likelihood of an event.156 This 
 
 155 Trope & Liberman, supra note 143, at 406. 
 156 Cheryl Wakslak & Yaacov Trope, The Effect of Construal Level on Subjective Probability Estimates, 
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 52 (2009). 
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means that the potential criminal actor may actually underestimate the 
likelihood of punishment if that punishment is perceived as temporally distant 
and therefore envisioned at a high level of mental construal. 
Weaving together the strands of self-control research and construal theory, 
psychologists have suggested that self-control “can be broadly conceptualized 
as making decisions and acting in accordance with global, high-level 
construal . . . rather than local, low-level construal.”157 In essence, 
psychologists posit that the regulation of behavior requires one to act in 
concert with high-level construals rather than low-level construals. Individuals 
who are able to keep their mental representations of actions in line with high-
level construals, then, are better at self-control than those whose mental 
representations focus on low-level qualities. So, for example, the individual 
whose mental representation of smoking captures its health effects rather than 
its pleasurable physical experience will be better able to refuse a cigarette, 
while the individual whose mental representation of a painful medical test 
involves maintaining good health rather than unpleasant physical experiences 
will be more likely to keep her doctor’s appointment. 
B. Implications of Construal Level Theory in Criminal Law 
If self-control failure, as it is explained in psychology, means a failure to 
appreciate the abstract nature of an event and to be swamped by its low-level 
construal in the moment, how might this relate to criminal law? The first thing 
to consider is what low-level and high-level construals might look like to the 
potential criminal actor. Any potential object, event, or action158 can be 
construed at a high or low level, and high and low levels will be defined 
differently depending on the characteristics of the person doing the construing 
as well as the situation. That is, construal level is in the eye of the beholder. As 
Fujita and colleagues explain: 
[F]or a student committed to performing well on final exams, an 
invitation to attend a party while studying may create a conflict 
between doing well on final exams (high-level concern that suggests 
not going to the party) and seeing one’s friends (low-level concern 
that suggests going to the party). . . . [W]hat are high- and low-level 
concerns may change as a function of the situation or individual 
differences. For example, for a person unconcerned about academics 
 
 157 Fujita et al., supra note 133, at 352. 
 158 Id. 
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but for whom social relationships are highly valued, seeing one’s 
friends at a party may represent a high-level concern, whereas 
studying for final exams may represent a low-level concern.159 
This means that differences in construal are highly contextual, and both the 
individual and type of crime may implicate different types of construal. 
Because any construal level analysis will be person-dependent and context-
dependent, it may be impossible to draw any broad inferences, but it is 
worthwhile to at least begin to chart out some possibilities. 
Imagine a potential criminal actor who is thinking about committing an 
armed robbery tomorrow. A basic economic analysis of costs and benefits 
would weigh factors including the amount of money likely to be made, the 
positive use of the money (food, other consumable items), and other potential 
benefits (enjoyment of criminal activity, perhaps) against the costs of the crime 
(costs of materials used in furtherance of the crime, opportunity costs of other 
possible activities during that time, potential punishment for the crime, or 
mental disturbance from engaging in criminal activity).160 But, adding in the 
insights from psychology, it would be easy to distill criminal activity into a 
classic conflict between short-term and long-term goals. One’s short-term 
goals are to get the value from the robbery, and one’s long-term goals are 
presumably to avoid punishment (or, perhaps, not to engage in criminal 
activity). And under construal theory, one could imagine that a self-control 
failure occurs because the short-term act is seen in low-level, concrete terms 
(immediate money), rather than in high-level, abstract terms (violating the law, 
subjecting oneself to punishment by the state). If one could control oneself, 
one would choose to have one’s actions comport with the long-term goal of 
avoiding punishment and to be a law-abiding citizen. If the robbery were going 
to occur next year instead of tomorrow, construal level theory predicts that the 
potential actor would be more likely to think about the abstract elements of the 
crime, rather than its mundane details, and would be more focused on the 
potential harm to self and society inherent in the act (high-level) instead of the 
money and purchasing power to be gained (low-level). This actor would find 
the prospect of the robbery less appealing because it would be seen in its most 
abstract form: with the potential for harm to self and others in the form of both 
violence and punishment by the state. 
 
 159 Id. at 352–53. 
 160 Of course, not all of these factors may be applicable for every person contemplating an armed robbery. 
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This simple paradigm is appealing, and taken at its face value, it provides 
support for the idea that all criminal acts are a product of self-control failure. 
Unfortunately, it does not adequately capture the host of possibilities for both 
low-level and high-level construal inherent in a decision to engage in criminal 
activity. So, for instance, low-level construal of an armed robbery 
contemplated for tomorrow could include both positive and negative features, 
such as buying a gun, getting money, being arrested or injured, putting food on 
the table for one’s children, or buying drugs. High-level construal of these 
same events could include providing for one’s family, righting some societal 
injustice, paying one’s debts, endangering one’s own or others’ safety, or 
violating the law. 
What this suggests is that any one criminal act might be a triumph of low-
level over high-level construal, meaning that it is a failure of self-control—but 
it might not. It could be that a criminal actor focuses on the high-level 
construal (say, providing for children) and overcomes his distaste for the low-
level features of the crime to comport with those high-level goals. Imagine an 
armed robber who, much like our patient who opts to undergo a painful 
medical procedure because of its long-term health benefits, chooses to exercise 
self-control by carrying out a criminal act to comport with his long-term goals. 
In another case, it might be that both the abstract, essential elements of the act 
and the concrete, specific elements of the act are in alignment for the particular 
individual: perhaps the person thinks that the low-level details of the criminal 
act are positive and that the high-level meaning of the criminal act is positive. 
This means that there is no particular need for any self-control mechanism; the 
person merely acts in accordance with his preferences. Construal level theory’s 
vision of self-control suggests that crime is a failure of self-control only when 
an individual has, somewhere in his mind, a goal of not breaking the law.161 
Crimes by individuals who do not have this goal cannot be characterized as 
self-control failures, just as smoking by someone who is an unrepentant 
smoker or overeating by someone who enjoys being obese cannot be 
characterized as self-control failures either. 
Although the simple paradigm may be inaccurate in a number of cases, 
there are presumably some situations where it is a reasonable representation of 
how an individual may perceive potential criminal behavior. In those cases, 
crimes that are unplanned or immediate may indeed represent a failure of self-
 
 161 Whether this goal is a product of some belief in adherence to the law or merely a desire to avoid 
punishment may be an important distinction, but for now I do not address this question. 
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control; the individual acts in concert with his low-level construal of 
immediate events and fails to act in a way that he might were he able to focus 
on high-level construal. High-level construal, because it focuses on the 
“cooler” aspects of the event, is thought to more closely track with what 
economists would call rational thinking.162 This means that self-control failure 
that is a result of temporal construal is a failure to “rationally” weigh the costs 
and benefits of the action.163 
For a utilitarian, these effects of temporal construal pose a serious threat to 
the model of the rational criminal actor. Hyperbolic discounting can be 
accounted for in the economic model: if individuals regularly discount future 
events by some factor, we could simply increase punishment to compensate for 
that discount. But if our prospective audience is not capable of performing a 
standard cost–benefit analysis because it is construing short-term and long-
term events in fundamentally different ways that cannot be directly compared 
to one another, then the economic model is not particularly helpful. In essence, 
temporal construal theory suggests that in order to turn potential criminal 
actors into rational actors, the law must draw the potential criminal actor’s 
attention to the high-level construal of the event in question. Without that high-
level construal to guide them, individuals are more likely to commit crime. 
How might one best draw a potential criminal actor’s attention to the high-
level features of a situation? Are there sanctions with special features that can 
shake the individual’s natural tendencies of temporal construal? It seems very 
difficult to deter an action by an individual that will provide him with a host of 
short-term benefits without in some measure forcing him to consider the 
abstract and high-level elements of his action, and it is in turn difficult to 
imagine a system that will be certain to remind him (as he contemplates 
criminal activity) of these abstract features of crime and punishment.164 This 
 
 162 See Fujita, supra note 142, at 1483 (“Cooler, more cognitive thinking is generally linked to more 
global, high-level construals, which may allow people to transcend the affective, appetitive features of a 
temptation.”). 
 163 This dovetails with Stephen Morse’s explanation that “control excuses are best understood as 
irrationality or internal coercion claims.” Morse, supra note 6, at 1656. 
 164 Recent government actions regarding public health concerns, such as obesity and road hazards, 
comport with psychological findings about construal. For example, New York City’s recent push to post 
calorie information on all fast food is in part an effort to change how individuals construe the choice to eat 
particular foods. See James Barron, Restaurants Must Post Calories, Judge Affirms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 
2008, at B4 (noting that the district court, in upholding the law, stated that providing calorie information will 
lead at least some consumers to choose lower calorie options, thereby reducing the incidence of obesity). The 
posting of calories serves as a reminder of the high-level construal of the act of eating, say, a Big Mac. While 
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suggests that a system of deterrence that looks like our present one fails to take 
into account some fundamental features of human information processing and 
that the economic model of criminal decision making may not adequately 
capture the way that individuals make decisions about criminal behavior. 
For someone concerned with retribution, construal level theory poses a 
different problem. If people have systematic ways of processing information so 
that events at a psychological distance are seen in their high-level construal 
and events temporally or otherwise near are seen in a low-level construal, then 
various societal factors, such as temporal and social distance, ought to be taken 
into account when deciding how much responsibility an individual has for his 
actions. In addition, there are individual differences in construal patterns; 
perhaps these need to be taken into account when considering criminal 
behavior. 
On the other hand, a retributivist may be able to take comfort from the fact 
that the criminal actor focused on the wrong aspect of the situation, even if 
there is a natural tendency to do such a thing. Instead of suggesting that the 
focus on low-level construal—the short-term focus—excuses the actor, a 
retributivist might consider that the actor inappropriately focused on certain 
aspects of criminal acts and not others. When so many other individuals are 
able to prioritize the high-level over the low-level construal, and when both 
ways to construe a situation are plausible, the retributivist may not feel the 
need to worry as much about the problem of self-control as an excusing factor. 
In addition, this vision of misguided focus may offer support for a 
differential assignment of responsibility for crimes that are premeditated and 
ones that are not. Because research findings suggest that events in the longer 
 
the low-level construal would focus on the taste of the burger and the enjoyment of satiating one’s hunger, the 
high-level construal is about the longer term consequences of eating unhealthy, fatty foods. 
Similarly, campaigns about texting while driving attempt to shift consumer focus away from the low-
level construal—immediate gratification of communicating instantly with one’s friends—to the high-level 
construal of potential danger and longer term risk to life and limb. See, e.g., A Message from Secretary 
LaHood, DISTRACTION.GOV, http://www.distraction.gov/content/about-us/message-from-secretary-LaHood. 
html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (describing a campaign initiated by the U.S. Department of Transportation to 
end distracted driving). Interestingly, some of these campaigns attempt to invoke grave consequences by 
depicting them in graphic and detailed ways—fighting a low-level positive construal with a low-level negative 
construal. See, e.g., PSA Highlights Aftermath of Distracted Driving Crashes, WBALTV.COM (Mar. 3, 2011, 
6:07 PM), http://www.wbaltv.com/r/27067600/detail.html (noting that videos discourage texting while driving 
by “depicting the fateful moments leading up to a crash and the heartbreaking news at the hospital”). This 
approach may be supported by new research suggesting that, under certain conditions, low-level construals 
may help self-control efforts. See Brandon J. Schmeichel et al., Self-Control at High and Low Levels of Mental 
Construal, 2 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 182 (2011). 
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term future are viewed at a higher level of abstraction,165 the person who 
contemplates a criminal act in the future is likely to have a higher level 
construal of that act. Higher level construal invokes classical rational 
cognition, and so these actors, if they follow through on the action that they 
contemplate, are thought to have acted rationally, which means that they have 
self-control. For these actors, then, we have a situation where, under deterrence 
theory, society has set the sanction too low to deter them. So we punish them 
merely to make our system credible for others who may recalibrate their own 
rational analysis accordingly. But for retributivists, the classical rational 
cognition that is involved in the decision to take action means that this 
individual is truly morally culpable and deserves punishment. 
IV.  THE STRENGTH MODEL OF SELF-CONTROL 
A. Research on the Strength Model of Self-Control 
Another line of robust self-control research over the last several decades 
has demonstrated that self-control consumes valuable cognitive resources from 
a fixed resource base.166 This has led to the “strength” model of self-control,167 
also called in the psychology literature “ego depletion.”168 The basic concept 
of this dominant model of self-control is that individuals have a finite supply of 
energy, or strength, that can be used for self-control; when that self-control has 
been used up, it is no longer available for some subsequent period of time.169 
 
 165 See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
 166 Although the strength model stemmed originally from the automatic versus effortful cognition model 
of self-regulation, which can be integrated into the temporal construal model, the strength model itself has not 
been explored vis-à-vis its relationship with temporal construal. As Fujita and colleagues have noted, “[A] 
construal-level analysis is largely mute with respect to ego-depletion models of self-control. . . . [A] construal-
level analysis . . . has little to say about the ego-depletion model’s core tenet that self-control is a limited 
resource.” Fujita et al., supra note 133, at 364 (citation omitted). 
 167 The strength model has been experimentally tested against two competing models, the schema model 
and the skill model. The schema model suggests that self-regulation is a set of behaviors that can be activated 
by the appropriate setting so that, in repeated settings, self-control would remain at a similar level. Mark 
Muraven et al., Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 774, 775 (1998). The skill model suggests that individuals ought to learn and improve as they 
engage in repeated self-regulation, so that their performance in a series of self-control tasks ought to steadily 
improve. Id. Research has not provided support for these theories but has provided support for the strength 
model. See id. at 786. 
 168 Researchers have settled on the term “ego depletion,” rather than self-control depletion, because the 
resource pool from which self-control comes seems to be broader, serving more than just a regulatory function. 
See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1252 (1998). 
 169 Id. 
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The model suggests that different individuals have differing levels of self-
control.170 There are at least two important insights that stem from the strength 
model of self-control. First, self-control is harder to achieve after other tasks 
have used up an individual’s self-regulatory strength;171 and second, just as 
strength of a muscle grows over time with practice, use of self-control over 
time can ultimately increase one’s capacity for self-control.172 
Because self-regulatory strength is a fixed resource, research has suggested 
that other tasks can deplete this energy. Early research suggested that an initial 
self-control task would interfere with effectiveness on a subsequent task. In 
one notable experiment, psychologist Baumeister and his colleagues brought 
participants into a room in which chocolate-chip cookies had just been freshly 
baked.173 The participants were seated at a table on which the fresh cookies, 
along with a few candies and a bowl of radishes, were already set. Participants 
were asked either to eat only the cookies or candy, or to eat only the radishes. 
Subsequently, participants were asked to complete an unsolvable problem-
solving task. Individuals who had been asked to eat radishes (and had therefore 
exerted self-control by not eating the forbidden cookies) spent significantly 
less time working on the problem than those who had eaten the cookies.174 
This result suggested that those who had exercised self-control in one task 
found their self-control depleted when it came time to exercise it in a later 
task.175 
Subsequent research has suggested that it is not only self-control tasks, per 
se, that deplete self-regulatory strength. Engaging in conscious choices,176 
engaging in self-control over one’s emotional responses,177 undergoing 
stressful experiences,178 and being reminded of one’s mortality179 produced 
 
 170 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 3. 
 171 Baumeister et al., supra note 168, at 1263. 
 172 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 3. 
 173 Baumeister et al., supra note 168, at 1254. 
 174 Id. at 1255. The numbers were dramatic: the radish eaters spent a little over eight minutes working on 
the problem, while the cookie eaters spent almost nineteen minutes plugging away. Id. In a control condition 
where no food was eaten, participants spent about twenty minutes on the task, a number not significantly 
different from that of the cookie eaters’. Id. 
 175 Id. at 1256. 
 176 Id. at 1256–58. 
 177 Id. at 1258–59. 
 178 Megan Oaten & Ken Cheng, Academic Examination Stress Impairs Self-Control, 24 J. SOC. & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 254, 254 (2005). 
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similar diminution in research subjects’ performance at other self-control tasks. 
Psychologists have concluded that there is a resource for executive functions of 
the self that is affected by a variety of factors.180 
Research on the relationship between emotions and self-control presents a 
complicated picture. Empirical data suggests that emotional distress causes a 
failure of self-control, and some research has suggested that this is because 
people spend their cognitive resources on affect regulation instead of behavior 
regulation.181 In an effort to change one’s mood or emotional state, one might 
engage in behavior that one believes will change one’s affect, such as 
overeating, drinking alcohol, or going to a movie when one should be studying, 
even if that behavior is contrary to how one might act in a state of full self-
control.182 Thus, it is not that emotional distress itself uses up the same 
resource needed for control of impulses; it is that individuals prioritized 
another type of self-regulation—regulation over their affect.183 One study 
suggested that “emotional distress interfered with self-regulation only when 
people believed . . . that abandoning impulse control in a particular sphere 
would allow them to reap rewards or pleasures that would be able to reduce 
their distress and produce a more positive emotional state.”184 In any event, 
whatever the mechanism at play, researchers agree that “emotional distress is 
itself often a drain on regulatory strength, insofar as people try to cope with 
and escape from the bad feelings. These efforts leave less strength left to use 
for task persistence, resisting temptation, and the like.”185 On the other hand, 
the effect of positive mood on self-control has been more mixed. Some 
research has found that positive mood boosts self-control,186 but other research 
 
 179 Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Self-Regulatory Processes Defend Against the Threat of Death: Effects of 
Self-Control Depletion and Trait Self-Control on Thoughts and Fears of Dying, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 49, 55–57 (2006). 
 180 See Baumeister, supra note 103, at 719. 
 181 Dianne M. Tice et al., Emotional Distress Regulation Takes Precedence over Impulse Control: If You 
Feel Bad, Do It!, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (2001). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 64. 
 185 Baumeister, supra note 103, at 719. Baumeister continues, “Clarifying the relations between emotional 
distress and regulatory success and failure will be one of the most theoretically interesting challenges of the 
coming years.” Id. 
 186 See Barbara L. Fredrickson et al., The Undoing Effect of Positive Emotions, 24 MOTIVATION & 
EMOTION 237, 238–39, 255–56 (2000); Tice et al., supra note 181. 
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has found an opposite effect,187 and yet more research has found no effect at 
all.188 
One interesting recent finding is that individuals can “pace themselves” 
with respect to self-control resources, essentially treating self-control as a 
limited resource.189 In a series of experiments, Muraven and his colleagues 
showed that when participants in an experiment thought that there would be an 
upcoming task that would require self-control, they changed their behavior on 
an earlier task to conserve their self-control.190 Additionally, participants who 
had already used some self-control were more concerned with conserving their 
self-control strength on an intervening task than others who had not done so.191 
The researchers concluded that “forethought and desire to exert self-control 
can lead to a breakdown of self-control in certain circumstances.”192 
Individuals are more passive after they have used up their regulatory 
strength, suggesting that there is a finite amount of volitional energy available. 
Regardless of whether a subsequent task requires active intervention to 
continue or to desist, individuals are more likely to choose the passive 
response.193 So, for example, one study demonstrated that individuals who had 
engaged in an initial series of choice-making behaviors were more likely, in a 
second stage of the experiment, to passively watch a broken videotape that 
showed no discernible picture than to alert the experimenter to the alleged 
problem.194 
 
 187 See Melissa A. Cyders & Gregory T. Smith, Mood-Based Rash Action and Its Components: Positive 
and Negative Urgency, 43 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 839, 840–41 (2007); Ayelet Fishbach & 
Aparna A. Labroo, Be Better or Be Merry: How Mood Affects Self-Control, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 158, 158 (2007); Carrie L. Wyland & Joseph P. Forgas, On Bad Mood and White Bears: The Effects 
of Mood State on Ability to Suppress Unwanted Thoughts, 21 COGNITION & EMOTION 1513, 1519 (2007). 
 188 Muraven et al., supra note 167, at 776–79; Harry M. Wallace & Roy F. Baumeister, The Effects of 
Success Versus Failure Feedback on Further Self-Control, 1 SELF & IDENTITY 35, 38 (2002). 
 189 Mark Muraven et al., Conserving Self-Control Strength, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 524, 525 
(2006). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 527. 
 192 Id. at 536. 
 193 Baumeister et al., supra note 168, at 1260–61. Individuals whose self-control was depleted were more 
passive in their responses to movie watching; they watched longer when continuing was passive than when 
continuing was active. Individuals without this depletion watched the movie for the same length of time, 
regardless of whether the stopping mechanism was active or passive. Id. 
 194 Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource 
Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 883, 
894–95 (2008). 
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Recent research has also sought to understand the underlying source of 
self-regulatory energy. Grounding the self-regulatory function firmly in human 
physiology, a novel set of experiments looked to blood glucose levels after 
self-control tasks to determine whether the self-regulatory resource had its 
origins there.195 This series of studies demonstrated that self-control exertion 
depletes blood glucose levels and also suggested that increasing blood glucose 
levels caused a significant change for the better in individuals’ abilities to 
regulate their behavior after an initial self-control task.196 Similarly, 
researchers have suggested that sleep and rest, too, have a significant effect on 
the self-regulatory resource.197 In sum, the strength model of self-control 
suggests that there are many demands placed on the resource that individuals 
also use for controlling their behavior. 
The self-control resource appears remarkably difficult to alter as a baseline 
matter, but there are a number of interventions that can boost performance on a 
subsequent self-control task after an initial task has depleted the self-control 
resource. The strength model of self-control research has suggested that, if 
self-control is like a muscle, perhaps it could be strengthened over time 
through practice.198 Researchers posited that strength could be improved in two 
distinct ways: power (a stronger baseline capacity) and stamina (longer 
perseverance before fatigue).199 In a short longitudinal study, Muraven and 
colleagues tested self-control at one point in time, sent participants home with 
instructions to perform a set of exercises in self-control, and then measured 
self-control again two weeks later.200 By measuring baseline capacity at the 
outset and two weeks later, as well as measuring the drop-off in self-control 
performance between an initial and a subsequent self-control task, the 
researchers were able to test whether self-control had improved over time and 
whether any improvement was in the baseline capacity or in the resistance to 
fatigue. Muraven’s results suggest that self-regulatory exercises during the 
two-week period did yield an increase in self-regulatory strength—but not in 
brute power because initial measures were similar.201 Instead, individuals who 
 
 195 Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Self-Control Relies on Glucose as a Limited Energy Source: Willpower Is 
More than a Metaphor, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 325 (2007). 
 196 Id. at 333. 
 197 Id. at 334. 
 198 Mark Muraven et al., Longitudinal Improvement of Self-Regulation Through Practice: Building Self-
Control Strength Through Repeated Exercise, 139 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 446, 448 (1999). 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 451–52. 
 201 Id. 453–56. 
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had practiced self-control during the two-week period were better able to 
continue to exert self-control in a subsequent task in the later session than they 
had been initially.202 As noted above, increasing glucose levels after an initial 
self-control task also raised the level of self-control in a subsequent task, but it 
had no effect on baseline self-control performance on “nondepleted” 
individuals.203 Similarly, recent research has suggested that self-affirmation—
an event that bolsters the integrity of the self—also boosts self-control after 
initial depletion but has no effect on baseline self-control.204 So, too, efforts to 
increase self-regulatory strength through monetary incentives205 or through 
boosting positive mood206 have failed to have an effect on baseline self-control 
performance. 
Of particular note for criminal law, self-control depletion has been found to 
have an effect on efforts to control aggressive tendencies. Participants in one 
study behaved more aggressively after a prior, unrelated self-control task than 
those who had not been taxed in the same way.207 Specifically, participants 
who restrained themselves from eating a donut were later more aggressive in 
an unrelated setting; in addition, participants who exerted control over their 
attention by watching a video while ignoring words on the bottom of the screen 
or who completed a different mentally challenging task were later more 
aggressive in response to an insult.208 Researchers have suggested that what 
they call “angry rumination,” where someone spends time reviewing an event 
that made them angry and “rehearsing acts of revenge,” also depletes self-
control resources and increases the likelihood of self-control failure.209 
 
 202 Id. at 451–52. 
 203 Gailliot et al., supra note 195, at 330–33. 
 204 Brandon J. Schmeichel & Kathleen Vohs, Self-Affirmation and Self-Control: Affirming Core Values 
Counteracts Ego Depletion, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 770, 770–79 (2009). 
 205 Mark Muraven & Elisaveta Slessareva, Mechanisms of Self-Control Failure: Motivation and Limited 
Resources, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 894, 903 (2003). 
 206 Dianne M. Tice et al., Restoring the Self: Positive Affect Helps Improve Self-Regulation Following 
Ego Depletion, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 379, 379, 383–84 (2007). 
 207 C. Nathan DeWall et al., Violence Restrained: Effects of Self-Regulation and Its Depletion on 
Aggression, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 62 (2007). 
 208 Id. at 64–68; see also David Gal & Wendy Liu, Grapes of Wrath: The Angry Effects of Self-Control, 
38 J. CONSUMER RES. 445 (2011) (finding that the exertion of self-control correlates with subsequent angry 
behavior in a variety of forms). 
 209 Thomas F. Denson, Angry Rumination and the Self-Regulation of Aggression, in PSYCHOLOGY OF 
SELF-REGULATION: COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND MOTIVATIONAL PROCESSES 233, 234–35 (Joseph P. Forgas et 
al. eds., 2009). 
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B. Implications of the Strength Model in Criminal Law 
If we take seriously the idea that self-control is a finite resource, this raises 
several intriguing questions about the “out of control” actor. If factors 
including the previous exercise of self-control, cognitive stress, and emotional 
disturbance can deplete this resource, an actor under such conditions is truly at 
a disadvantage when trying to self-regulate. This insight is captured by the 
laws that authorize lesser culpability with respect to crimes committed in the 
heat of passion or in the face of provocation, but it is rejected by the laws that 
deny consideration of extreme emotional disturbance or other reasons for 
diminished capacity. If all of these factors affect the self-control resource 
similarly, this calls for a much greater exploration of the underlying reasons for 
excusing self-control failures in some depleted instances and not in others. 
For utilitarians, the strength model of self-regulation suggests that rather 
than requiring an increase in sanctions to get that actor to recalibrate his cost–
benefit analysis, we may truly feel that there is no sanction that could make 
him act in accordance with the law because he simply lacks the resources to do 
so. For that reason, a strength model of self-regulation may suggest to the 
utilitarian that no sanctions are necessary when the self-control resource has 
been depleted.210 There are two countervailing arguments that may rescue 
sanctions for the utilitarian. First, if self-regulatory strength is a resource that 
can be self-consciously managed or conserved, then deterrence still plays a 
crucial role:  if an individual is aware that sanctions exist that will make his 
exercise of self-control critical in the future, then he ought to conserve his 
strength for those situations. Second, if we believe that self-regulatory strength 
may be increased over time with practice, the existence of sanctions for 
uncontrolled actions may provide an incentive for the actor to practice and 
strengthen his self-control. 
For the retributivist, too, the resource model of self-control tracks with the 
notion that there are occasions when we feel that an individual actor who is 
“out of control” already had those self-control resources severely taxed by 
other conditions in a way that ought to lessen liability. Additionally, the idea 
that the individual may simply have low self-regulatory strength211 may mean 
 
 210 But see Bradley R.E. Wright et al., Does the Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone 
Individuals? Rational Choice, Self-Control, and Crime, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 180, 205 (2004) 
(analyzing data to suggest that the threat of punishment is most important for those who are low in self-control 
and high in self-reported criminal propensity). 
 211 See DeWall et al., supra note 207. 
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that we should consider this an innate defect, just as insanity or diminished 
capacity may be. And, indeed, if control is a matter of individual differences, 
where do those differences come from, and do individuals have any 
meaningful control over their traits?212 This leads us back to the most basic 
questions about free will and its role in law. As Robert Weisberg says, this 
issue “seems to torture our best thinkers,”213 and it is without a doubt outside 
the scope of my project here. But the strength model adds an extra step in 
thinking about this issue: because individuals can improve their self-regulatory 
function over time, we may consider them blameworthy when they have not 
done so. While it is still true that some may lack the desire to improve, this 
potential for improvement offers us the possibility that, with practice, anyone 
could have learned to do better. 
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
A. Doctrinal Implications 
If one were to take seriously the psychological research on self-control in 
the context of criminal behavior, how might one think about specific crimes 
differently? Because criminal law spans so many different domains, it is worth 
thinking about the implications in a handful of contexts. One could imagine, 
for example, that the implications for self-control research might differ 
between violent crime and white collar crime. I explore only a few domains in 
criminal law below; the discussion does not seek to exhaust the many areas of 
criminal liability but merely to show how the psychology research in self-
control plays out differently in several areas. 
Because certain types of violent crime may often be a product of strong 
emotion, the interaction between emotion and self-control is important in this 
context. As noted above, an individual’s capacity for self-control is diminished 
in the face of emotional distress. Research suggests that this is because an 
individual’s executive function capacity is too busy working to improve affect. 
Sometimes, this means that self-control in other areas will suffer as individuals 
 
 212 See Arenella, supra note 25; see also David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1623, 1655 (1992) (“The alacrity with which even thoughtful and sophisticated retributivists such as 
Morse, Morris, and Dressler dismiss suggestions that economic, social, cultural, or psychological deprivations 
might excuse or mitigate criminal conduct suggests that the harshly punitive attitudes of legal actors and the 
public that were noted above are not misuses of retributivism but its logical outgrowth.” (footnote omitted)). 
 213 Robert Weisberg, The Values of Interdisciplinarity in Homicide Law Reform, 43 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 53, 75 (2009). 
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make decisions that they believe will improve their mood. Here, it may be that 
the very behavior that society would like individuals to control, the natural 
consequence of their violent impulse, is directly connected to the negative 
emotion they are experiencing and that the action they believe will ameliorate 
their negative emotional state is the act of violence itself. If affect regulation 
does trump self-control, some violent crime may be explained as an effort to 
improve mood. 
In terms of how violent crime relates to the strength model of self-control, 
it seems that individuals who had other demands on their executive function 
resources would be more likely to engage in violent behavior—in other words, 
more likely to give in to the behavior suggested by a violent impulse and less 
likely to be able to exert control over their behavior and refrain from acting on 
the impulse. This vision of self-control tracks well with the law’s attempt to 
carve out defenses for more impulsive and less premeditated criminal behavior. 
But the law distinguishes between the various demands on our cognitive 
resources in a way that the psychology research does not. That is, a taxonomy 
of ways to exhaust the cognitive resource that self-control depends upon is not 
freighted, in psychology, with any meaning: each way in which the resource 
can be depleted is merely another in a list of potential depleting factors. But in 
law, these factors are evaluated based on different criteria, including whether 
the factors were, themselves, self-induced, and may also be evaluated 
differently depending on whether one takes a retributivist or a utilitarian tack. 
In addition, those individuals who are low in self-regulatory strength as a 
general matter will also be more likely to engage in violent behavior. The 
law’s use of the reasonable or ordinary person standard implies that there may 
be a level of self-regulatory strength that we consider “reasonable.” And yet 
empirical work has never measured the population in order to identify such a 
level. Perhaps this is not a problem; if there is only a small percentage of the 
population who violate the standard, we may assume that we have struck the 
right point on the spectrum. But the self-regulatory resource model suggests 
that more work on identifying further parameters of this strength would be 
useful. 
Interestingly, if one critical aspect of self-control is identifying the 
appropriate norm,214 it may be that certain violent crimes represent a clash of 
norms. Consider a cultural norm of self-defense: certain cultures suggest that 
 
 214 See supra notes 134–41 and accompanying text. 
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the appropriate response to a threat or a provocation would be to defend 
oneself or defend one’s honor through attack, whereas other cultures might 
suggest that the appropriate response would be to seek help or to leave the 
scene.215 Using the self-control feedback loop, someone who has identified the 
self-defense or the substantial provocation norm may then conform his or her 
behavior to the wrong (for society) norm. Some theorists, however, believe 
that this type of situation represents an acquiescence to impulse and an 
abandonment of self-regulation; someone may believe it is “appropriate, 
reasonable, or even desirable to abandon self-control.”216 These scholars 
suggest that culture plays a significant role in determining when individuals 
choose to lose control over their behavior. Misregulation also suggests that 
people may simply be wrong about their calculations of costs and benefits of 
certain behavior. As Baumeister has explained, self-control failure may occur 
because “[p]eople . . . are trying to control the wrong aspect of the process or 
because they are trying to control something that is essentially immune to 
control.”217 
Premeditated crime suggests a different role for self-control research. 
Premeditated crime draws attention to the failure of research in psychology to 
fully explore behaviors in individuals that comport with those individuals’ 
goals, even if those goals violate society’s norms. But a foundational aspect of 
self-control theory in psychology may provide a useful frame for this problem, 
as well: the feedback loop that researchers have posited as crucial in 
appropriate self-monitoring requires, initially, the identification of an 
appropriate standard to test behavior against. When someone identifies a 
standard that requires him to engage in behavior that involves planned violent 
crime, he has chosen wrongly—but it does not mean that he is not engaged in 
effective self-regulation. In this case, the psychology of self-control suggests 
that the criminal actor has identified a (wrong) standard, but that he is effective 
in making his behavior match his goals. Alternatively, the psychology of self-
control may suggest that the criminal actor has been irrational in his weighing 
of the pros and cons of his action because of temporal construal. In either case, 
however, the premeditated criminal actor, if he is aware of an alternative 
 
 215 For discussions of use of the “cultural defense,” in which defendants in the United States, typically 
from another country, attempt to introduce evidence of their culture of origin as the basis for lack of 
culpability, see James J. Sing, Note, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and 
Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845 (1999); and Sharon M. Tomao, Note, The Cultural Defense: 
Traditional or Formal?, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 241 (1996). 
 216 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 9. 
 217 Id. at 11. 
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standard for his conduct or has overweighted the concrete gains of the action 
against the more abstract harms, could be held to a higher standard because his 
actions are fully self-regulated. In this situation, legal doctrine tracks the 
insights of psychology by penalizing premeditating criminals with a higher 
level of punishment. 
White collar crime presents similar but perhaps even more complex 
problems vis-à-vis the psychology of self-control. Corporations are filled with 
highly educated individuals who have regularly delayed gratification in some 
domains in order to achieve longer term gains. They are, in Mischel’s basic 
terms, successful grown-ups.218 The research on self-control resource 
development would suggest that these are likely to be individuals who are 
highly practiced in self-control and who thus have a strong self-control 
resource that ought to be slower to be depleted. This would suggest, then, that 
these white collar crimes are less likely to represent a failure of self-control 
and more likely, as with premeditated violent crime, to represent a problem 
with identification of the appropriate norm by which to regulate one’s conduct. 
In a self-control feedback loop, individuals in corporations may be most 
concerned with controlling their behavior to comport with relevant office 
policies and directives from superiors, rather than with the law. Therefore, self-
control may be quite high in corporate settings; it is just that it is used in some 
instances to conform one’s behavior to a corporate norm that encourages or 
even mandates criminal behavior.219 
However, as with other premeditated crime, issues of temporal construal 
may change the way a potential wrongdoer’s rational cost–benefit calculus 
looks. The immediate, low-level benefits of wrongdoing such as altering 
financial records—pleasing one’s superiors, posting quarterly gains, raising 
stock prices—may be more appealing than the high-level construal of violating 
professional and legal rules. However, high-level construal of financial 
wrongdoing may include long-term career enhancement, in which case one 
could not suggest that such criminal activity is a self-control failure as 
psychology defines it. In some financial crimes, positive high-level construal 
might not only suggest that the crime is not a product of self-control failure but 
that it is actually a product of self-control. 
 
 218 See infra text accompanying note 110. 
 219 There is certainly evidence that corporate norms have a strong effect on individuals within the 
corporation. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee 
Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143 (2005). 
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If white collar crime represents a situation in which self-control is fully 
present, both utilitarian and retributive arguments would suggest a 
corresponding increase in punishment. The utilitarian would argue that the 
costs of the behavior must be raised in order to alter the very deliberate 
calculus about the criminal behavior, while a retributivist would suggest that 
the full nature of the self-control provides support for stronger penalties. 
Drug-related crimes raise very different self-control issues. Crime that is 
committed while under the influence of drugs directly implicates self-control 
failures:  drugs and alcohol have an immediate and powerful effect on the 
executive function’s capacity. Because drugs and alcohol impair cognitive 
functioning, they necessarily have the effect of diminishing self-control.220 As 
noted above, although psychology research—unlike law—does not make 
normative distinctions between types of depletion, the self-control strength 
model still provides some useful insight into this conduct. Even though the law 
may be willing to acknowledge and consider demands on self-control in 
determining culpability, the understanding that self-control is a strength that 
can be developed through practice and exercise, as well as a resource that can 
be conserved when necessary, helps make sense of the law’s typical lack of 
openness to defenses based on alcohol and drug use. Individuals who use or 
are addicted to alcohol or drugs are not developing their self-control strength; 
indeed, they are doing quite the opposite. And because someone has depleted 
his self-regulatory strength through his own choice of action,221 the law does 
not accommodate an effort to alter the degree of his culpability or 
punishment.222 
B. Theoretical Implications 
In contrast to legal theorists, who assume that individuals—including 
criminals—mostly can control themselves, even if they sometimes choose not 
 
 220 For example, roughly one-quarter to one-third of prisoners report that the crime that they committed 
occurred while they were under the influence of drugs. See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ONDCP DRUG POLICY INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE FACT SHEET: DRUG DATA 
SUMMARY (2003), available at http://www.expomed.com/drugtest/files/drugdata.pdf. 
 221 I leave to the side the free will issue implicated in addiction. See supra text accompanying notes 91–
93. 
 222 For crime related to drug sales, rather than drug use, the picture is somewhat different. This crime, 
using a self-control lens, looks more like other types of premeditated crimes because the individual’s self-
control has not been impaired by an outside influence. The first problem is a lack of the correct standard by 
which to monitor one’s actions; the second concern is with the problem of temporal construal and its distortion 
of present benefits to impair rational behavior. 
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to, psychologists writing about criminal behavior have concluded that “crimes 
practically define failure of self-control as it is usually conceived.”223 As noted 
above, there is a host of evidence that low self-control is related to negative 
outcomes,224 and there is a compelling empirical case that poor self-control is a 
critical factor in criminal behavior.225 So, on the one hand, much of criminal 
law and criminal law scholarship assumes as a baseline that most criminal 
behavior is fully controlled behavior. Some smaller subset of criminal behavior 
is due to “noncontrol,” that is, what amounts to a conscious choice not to 
control oneself that is treated as identical to control itself. And some still 
smaller subset of criminal behavior is due to a “true” incapacity to exert self-
control. In contrast, the psychological perspective assumes that most criminal 
behavior is a product of an individual’s inability to control his actions.226 
This tremendous difference may be accounted for primarily by different 
conceptions of self-control failure between the disciplines of law and 
psychology; these differences help to highlight the essential features and 
implications of each vision. For legal scholars, failure of self-control is only 
exculpatory when we believe someone “truly” cannot exercise control; any 
other behavior is assumed to be a product of self-control. That is, when 
someone simply does not, rather than cannot, control his behavior, the law 
suggests that control continues to play a central role because that individual is, 
at some level, in control of his decision to abandon control. Therefore, lack of 
self-control only matters when we believe that the lack is compulsory, rather 
than optional. But literature in psychology (and, relatedly, in criminology227) 
suggests that all crime occurs because someone either could not or did not 
exercise control, and furthermore suggests that the distinction between “could 
not” and “would not” is immaterial. Indeed, psychological research challenges 
the very existence of this divide, largely by ignoring it. Any time someone 
 
 223 Hirschi, supra note 124, at 540. 
 224 See, e.g., Ozlem Ayduk et al., Regulating the Interpersonal Self: Strategic Self-Regulation for Coping 
with Rejection Sensitivity, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 776, 777 (2000). 
 225 See Wright et al., supra note 210. 
 226 See, e.g., Hirschi, supra note 124, at 540; Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy F. Baumeister, Understanding 
Self-Regulation: An Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND 
APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 1, 8. 
 227 Criminology focuses on “what actually causes crime and on how best to control it . . . .” Stuart A. 
Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology: Power, Authority, and the Post-Liberal State, 23 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 857, 859 (1998). The scope of criminology goes well beyond concerns about self-
control, but it is a well-worn trope in the criminology literature that self-control failure plays a significant role 
in producing criminal behavior. See, e.g., GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 124, at 89–91. 
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violates societal norms, the psychological perspective stamps this a failure of 
self-control. 
This lack of nuance in the psychological literature calls out for attention. 
When psychologists assert that all crime is a product of self-control failure, this 
embeds an assumed set of shared norms that is simply not accurate. Research 
that appreciates and examines differences in behavior between those who share 
and do not share particular norms is critical to the development of deeper and 
more sophisticated connections between law and psychology. 
While the conceptual differences in “self-control” between the disciplines 
of law and psychology may play some role in accounting for complete lack of 
critical examination by legal scholars of empirical research in social 
psychology on the mechanisms of self-control, these distinctions may 
themselves serve as a useful catalyst for discussion about the role of self-
control in criminal law. While social psychology focuses not on the roots of 
self-control failure writ large but rather on the causes of self-control failure 
writ small, so too legal doctrine makes the same leap: questions of free will, 
writ large, are outside the scope of what the criminal law will consider,228 but 
purportedly smaller questions of individual control over particular acts remain 
of deep concern.229 And yet social psychology casts a far wider net over self-
control failure. Even narrowing the scope of self-control failure to situations 
where an individual truly does want to comport with the relevant societal 
norm, the temporal construal problems that inhere even in efforts to act 
rationally and the vision of self-control as a resource that is fairly easily 
depleted both suggest that self-control failures in psychology are far more 
common than the failures of self-control that the law is willing to recognize 
and allow. 
In particular, the contrast between what legal scholars and psychologists 
conceptualize as self-control failure points up quite starkly that the law makes 
normative determinations about when a loss of self-control is meaningful and 
 
 228 See, e.g., State v. Sikora, 210 A.2d 193, 203 (N.J. 1965) (“[W]e cannot accept a thesis that 
responsibility in law for a criminal act perpetrated by a legally sane defendant, can be considered nonexistent 
or measured by the punishment established for a crime of lower degree, because his act was motivated by 
subconscious influences of which he was not aware, and which stemmed inevitably from his individual 
personality structure.”). 
 229 See, e.g., Zamora v. Phillips, No. 04-CV-4093 (JFB), 2006 WL 2265079, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 
2006) (“In determining whether a petitioner has acted out of a loss of self control, the court will look at the 
petitioner’s conduct before and after the homicide.”). 
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when it is not.230 For example, as noted above, the law does not permit lesser 
punishments when an individual fails to exercise self-control after drinking or 
using drugs, even though the individual’s acts might be no less out of his 
control than the acts might be in the face of provocation or heat of passion. 
While psychology makes no special distinctions between the types of demands 
placed on one’s self-control strength, the law draws many fine lines that do 
not, in fact, delineate control or lack thereof as they purport to do but instead 
reflect a normative judgment about the type of behavior involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Considering crime as a problem bound up with issues of self-control—a 
premise central to criminal law theory and doctrine—suggests that legal 
scholars and lawyers should take the psychology of self-control seriously. But 
caveats are certainly in order. One important problem is highlighted in the 
above discussion about temporal construal. Typically, self-control literature 
posits self-control problems as those in which an individual must either resist 
engaging in an appealing but undesirable activity, like smoking or eating 
unhealthy food, or must persist in an unappealing but desirable activity, such 
as exercising or maintaining a budget. Yet the psychology literature does not 
typically differentiate between subjective and objective norms, so that 
discussions of self-control behaviors often center around societally 
undesirable—or desirable—activities without any test of the individual 
perspective on those activities. Thus an “overeater” is perceived as having a 
self-control problem whether or not he himself considers overeating to be a 
problem; a smoker who does not view smoking or its potential consequences 
as problematic is nonetheless considered to suffer a self-regulation failure.231 
In the case of criminal behavior, a typical self-control failure as understood by 
psychology would be when an individual adopted the objective norm of 
criminalized behavior and understood that the behavior was undesirable232 but 
 
 230 Others have explicitly noted the normative nature of criminal law efforts around doctrine that centers 
on questions of self-control. See Stephen J. Morse, The Irreducibly Normative Nature of Provocation/Passion, 
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 193, 205 (2009). 
 231 Thus, some researchers have described self-control from a motivational perspective: “If the person 
does not have a strong inner desire to reach [a particular] standard, then merely knowing the standard is not 
likely to produce effective self-regulation.” Joseph P. Forgas et al., The Psychology of Self-Regulation: An 
Introductory Review, in PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-REGULATION: COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND MOTIVATIONAL 
PROCESSES, supra note 209, at 1, 11. 
 232 Even if the temporal construal issues made this calculation tip in favor of the criminal activity, that 
calculation represents a different situation from one in which the actor truly believes that the action is 
completely appropriate, per some internal standard. 
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was not able to control his behavior in order to comport with the law. The self-
control literature in psychology does not offer a perfect paradigm to capture 
the behavior of the individual who adopts—and adheres to—a subjective norm 
that violates the law. Another concern for application to law is the relative 
paucity of psychology research on how, exactly, self-control can be developed. 
However, as the self-control research continues to grow, insights from the law, 
and questions that arise from seriously considering this research in light of our 
legal system, should be taken more seriously in helping to develop appropriate 
research questions for investigation. 
Nonetheless, important principles emerge in considering psychological 
research on self-control in the criminal law context. Research findings that 
self-control is better when individuals can focus on high-level abstract 
concepts about actions can help us think about what kinds of systems could 
make such focus possible, but we must acknowledge that not everyone’s 
abstract concepts about actions will, themselves, comport with the 
requirements of criminal law. Similarly, findings that self-control is a finite 
resource may help us to make better sense of the places in our criminal law 
system where we hold an individual less culpable because of other factors that 
have reasonably depleted that resource, and also may help us to be more aware 
of the normative nature of distinctions among ways in which the resource was 
depleted. Self-control research in psychology also offers a suggestion for both 
prevention and rehabilitation: if self-control is a resource that can be 
strengthened over time with practice, perhaps this is a fruitful area for further 
development in our at-risk populations. Considering the major findings of 
social psychology research on self-control as they relate to criminal law both 
sheds light on, and poses further questions for, our conceptualizations of self-
control as a guiding principle in crime and punishment. 
 
